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THE STRUCTURE OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: THE SCOPE OF THE
PROTECTION*
JOHN M. JUNKER**
Fourth amendment doctrine consists of three foundational ele-
ments: scope, content, and remedy. This essay examines the first of
these elements: the scope of the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment. Its purpose is
to describe and assess the doctrine that determines whether that
amendment governs the conduct sought to be remedied.
In its most elementary form, the scope inquiry asks whether the
challenged governmental conduct amounted to a "search" or
"seizure," but these textual referents are only the starting point for
our journey into the doctrinal-political' labyrinth of fourth amend-
ment analytics. The textual version of the "content" inquiry is even
more cryptic: whether the search or seizure was "reasonable." The
"remedy" issue is, in criminal cases (the dominant but not exclusive
source of fourth amendment doctrine) whether the product of an
unreasonable search or seizure is subject to the exclusionary rule.
As many have noted, there is no explicit textual referent to a remedy
for such violations. 2
Each of these elementary descriptions of the three basic struc-
tural components of fourth amendment doctrine undergoes two
levels of elaboration. Each may be described in terms of a relatively
concise set of analytic categories, and those categories themselves
* Copyright 1988 by John M. Junker. All rights reserved.
** Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. B.A. 1959, Washing-
ton State University; J.D. 1962, University of Chicago. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the helpful suggestions by his colleagues, Professors Arval A. Morris and Louis E.
Wolcher, and by Professors Francis A. Allen and Yale Kamisar, all of whom reviewed
and commented upon an earlier draft. The Article was supported in part by research
grants from the University of Washington School of Law during the summers of 1985-
87.
1 "Political" refers to the process of determining the official dominance of one value
over a competing value.
2 Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a Principled Basis Rather than
an Empirical Proposition?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565, 581-597 (1983).
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branch into sets of rules that apply to given circumstances or factual
settings. For example, whether a particular observation by the po-
lice, say from an airplane, is a "search"-that is, within the scope of
the fourth amendment-depends on whether that conduct is
deemed to have affected the legitimate expectation of privacy of the
person who seeks to exclude evidence derived from such an obser-
vation. In the case of aerial surveillance, the "legitimacy" of such an
expectation turns on whether the observed premises are deemed to
be within the officer's "plain view," and that question, in turn, will
depend upon the circumstances of the officer's location (whether or
not in "public airspace") and the means by which the observation
was made (whether by naked eye, enhanced vision or more sophisti-
cated surveillance devices). In short, at the analytic level, "plain
view" negates "search;" at the circumstantial level, a legal vantage
point and conventional techniques yield a "plain view. ' 3
This Article proceeds from a general description of the entire
structure and a wide-angle view of fourth amendment doctrine since
Mapp v. Ohio,4 to a detailed analysis of the United States Supreme
Court's decisions affecting the scope of the fourth amendment.5
The structural components of fourth amendment doctrine ap-
pear, in a tactical setting, as a series of obstacles to exclusion of the
challenged evidence, because each must in turn be hurdled or exclu-
sion will be denied. Only if the conduct by which the police ac-
quired the evidence is within the scope of the fourth amendment
does it make sense to ask whether that conduct was "unreasonable."
Further, only if one of the rules that comprise the content of the
amendment was violated does it make sense to ask whether the
product of the violation is subject to exclusion. Logically, therefore,
the assessment of fourth amendment issues should be addressed in
that order: scope, content, remedy. Because of the vulnerability of
the exclusionary rule, however, there are more than a few examples
in which the order has been reversed. 6 Analytic confusion between
3 This is the official resolution of the aerial surveillance controversy. As we shall
see, an alternate analytic route would yield the opposite result.
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 For historical overviews of the fourth amendment prior to AMapp v. Ohio see J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966) and N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTI-
TUTION (1937).
6 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
620 (1980)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 437
(1980)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 (1979)(Burger, C.J., dissenting); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S.
154 (1978); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,
432 (1976)(Powell, J., concurring); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Coo-
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scope and content issues, though less apparent, is even more com-
mon in the Court's decisions, and often occurs, one suspects, in the
quest for a particular result.7
These same structural components may be viewed as pawns in a
political controversy that inheres in organized society: the tension
between the individual claim to privacy and autonomy and the col-
lective demand for crime control and security.8 Every fourth
amendment decision chooses, at the margin, which of these oppos-
ing values to prefer, and the doctrine reflects and accommodates
that choice. The immediate task is to explicate the analytic catego-
ries through which that accommodation is expressed.
I. THE ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF PRIVACY
This Article makes two claims for the analytic structure it de-
scribes. First, that the analysis applies to any attempt to give legal
protection to privacy, regardless of the particular text by which that
protection is expressed. State constitutions, such as those of Ari-
zona9 and Washington,10 that mention neither searches, seizures,
warrants nor probable cause, nonetheless generate doctrines that fit
comfortably within the analytic categories.
Second, the components of the analytic framework presented
here are comprehensive (although not exclusive). Every fourth
amendment issue falls within a particular analytic category, and
although the categories overlap, they do so in instructive ways. Of
course, these are empty claims unless the analysis also facilitates
one's ability to understand, assess and use privacy doctrine. The
proof of that is in the analytic scheme.
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492, 510 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting, Black-
mun, J., dissenting); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 429 (1969)(Black, J.,
dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985)(Brennan, J., dissenting);
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537 (1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v.
ViIlamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 809
(1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971); United States v.
Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970). See generally La Fave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On
Allen's " 'Process of Factualization'in the Search and Seizure Cases", 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 440
n.77 (1985)(In discussing several "content" issues, the author notes that "[m]any of the
activities deemed outside the fourth amendment entirely... would be better viewed as
inside the amendment but subject to lesser limitations .. .
8 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 438 (1973);
Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open
Fields Doctrine), 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986).
9 Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8.
10 Wash. Const. art. I, § 7.
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Issues concerning the scope of the protection consist only of
the following:
1. whether government conducted, instigated or participated
in the challenged activity;1 '
2. whether the challenged activity amounted to a "search" or
''seizure;"12
3. whether such a search or seizure affected the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" of the party challenging the intrusion; 13
4. whether such a search or seizure affected that party's "per-
son, house, papers or effects;' 14
5. whether the challenging party's fourth amendment protec-
tion has been defeased by abandonment,' 5  consent' 6  or
incarceration; 17
Thus, to be within the scope of the fourth amendment, the
moving party must establish that government agents have engaged
in a search or seizure that affected such party's undefeased legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in his or her person, house, papers or
effects. If successful, the party is entitled to a hearing on whether
the intrusion was "reasonable" under the rules that provide the con-
tent of the protection.
The content rules are of two general types, concerning either
the predicate for, or the manner of executing, a given search or
seizure. Because the Court has, in the past twenty years, been in-
creasingly willing to tailor the predicate required for a search or
seizure according to its judgment of the magnitude of the intrusion,
the "predicate" requirement has grown increasingly complex.' 8 De-
lI See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
12 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct.
1134 (1987); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986); Maryland v. Ma-
con, 472 U.S. 463 (1985); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Because an in-
trusion that invades a "reasonable expectation of privacy" is therefore a "search" or
"seizure," and vice versa, these rubrics are logically redundant. Whether they are also
analytically redundant will be determined after further examination of the criteria by
which the Court assigns one or the other as its premise or its conclusion.
14 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176 (1984).
15 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988); see also Walter v. United States,
447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(where defendants did not seek re-
turn of misdelivered films turned over to the FBI until after their indictment on obscen-
ity charges. Justice Blackmun argued that their expectation of privacy "was abandoned
by their shunning the property ... for over 20 months." Id. at 665).
16 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
17 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537 (1984)(O'Connor, J., concurring).
18 See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987); New York v. Burger, 107 S.
Ct. 2636 (1987); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
1108 [Vol. 79
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spite the occasional emphasis on "bright line" criteria to facilitate
enforcement,' 9 the Court prefers dim lines where they serve the ma-
jority's purpose. 20 Moreover, using the device of a "diminished"
expectation of privacy, the Court has on occasion reduced the predi-
cate requirement almost to the vanishing point.2' Conversely, the
Court recently required a predicate more rigorous than probable
cause and a warrant for a surgical search, 22 reflecting the "aug-
mented" expectation of privacy in the integrity of one's body.23
Governmental conduct within the scope of the protection violates
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures only if:
1. the government does not possess the predicate required for
the kind of activity undertaken, including, for example, probable
cause to search or to "associate . . . seized material with criminal
activity," 24 reasonable suspicion to detain persons or things,25 aju-
dicial warrant or exigent circumstances, 26 administrative or statu-
tory authorization of inspections, 27 and every other pre-intrusion
325 (1985); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); United States v. Villamonte-Mar-
quez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981); Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967). See also LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person
to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 417-19
(1984) (describing the elaboration of categories of seizures of the person).
19 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
20 See, e.g., Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1988); United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See also Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83
MICH. L. REv. 1468, 1471 (1985)(The author compares what he terms the "no lines"
and the "bright line" approaches to search and seizure decisions, concluding that the
former approach "in most cases . .. reflects the result, though not the reasoning, of
current Supreme Courts cases.").
21 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
22 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
23 Notwithstanding this proliferation of individualized predicates for particular intru-
sions-a phenomenon captured with the term "variable content"--and despite the
Court's continued invocation of the old regime-that warrantless searches "are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions," Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20
(1984)(per curiam), the dichotomy between the predicate for and the execution of
searches and seizures expresses the only fundamental difference to be found in the con-
tent rules.
24 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1985).
25 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United
States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
26 See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984)(per curiam); Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
27 See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, (1987); United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981); United States v.
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requisite to the legality of the conduct; 28 or
2. the officers executing the intrusion (a) exceed the zone
within which the intrusion is permitted, for example the Chimel 29-
Belton 30 zone limiting searches incident to arrest to the person of the
arrestee and the area from which he or she might grab a weapon or
evidence, including the passenger compartment of a vehicle, or
(b) search more intensely31 or seize more onerously32 or for a
longer duration 33 than their predicate permits.
Although these latter rules governing the execution of intru-
sions could also be viewed as cases in which the police lacked the
predicate for the action taken, there are analytic advantages to treat-
ing such cases as beyond the authority possessed, rather than as a
variety of an insufficient predicate. Useful, not maximal, reduction
is the analytic objective. Because courts use the predicate-execution
dichotomy to describe fourth amendment doctrine, 34 understanding
will be better served by assessing rather than by submerging the
distinction.
The final component, remedy, is restricted in this essay to the
rule excluding the product of an unreasonable search as evidence in
a criminal, delinquency, or forfeiture proceeding. Except for the
rule in Stone v. Powell,35 precluding federal habeas corpus review of
fourth amendment issues following a "full and fair" opportunity to
litigate that issue on direct review, the limits on exclusion are not
unique to search and seizure cases. Limiting exclusion to evidence
derived from the violation-the "fruit of the poisonous tree" limita-
tion 36 -is a logical feature of any exclusionary rule.37 Similarly, the
use of illegally obtained evidence acquired in "good faith," 38 or to
impeach,39 are exceptions to the exclusionary rule, not to the fourth
amendment.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72
(1970); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
28 E.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)(knock-and-announce requirement).
29 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
30 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
31 See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85
(1979); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), modified, United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982).
32 E.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
33 E.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
34 E.g., Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 200.
35 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
36 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
37 See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442-44 (1984).
38 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).




Issues concerning the remedy of exclusion consist only of the
following:
1. whether the evidence sought to be excluded was the prod-
uct of the violation of the moving party's fourth amendment right.40
2. whether such evidence is used to establish the elements of
the government's case against such party or to impeach his or her
credibility as a witness. 4'
3. whether the party challenging admission seeks relief on di-
rect or collateral review.42
4. whether the challenged evidence was "obtained by officers
acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant . . . ultimately
found to be unsupported by probable cause," 43 or pursuant to a
statute, later found unconstitutional, authorizing a warrantless
search.44
II. A NOTE ON REMEDY
It is one of the curiosities of fourth amendment law that its rem-
edy, the exclusionary rule, has consistently upstaged the substantive
rules governing the scope and content of constitutionally protected
privacy.45 In part, the prominence of the exclusionary rule derives
from the fact that its use always dramatically subordinates the search
for truth in favor of the protection of individual privacy and oper-
ates to the immediate benefit of an otherwise inculpated criminal
defendant.46 Less obviously, the exclusionary rule and its vessel,
Mapp v. Ohio,47 not only generated an explosion of fourth amend-
ment privacy doctrine, but also ushered in a new constitutional era
of incorporated Bill of Rights protections for persons charged with a
crime in state criminal proceedings. 48
Although Gideon v. Wainwright49 came two years after Mapp, all
but a few states had already provided counsel for indigent criminal
defendants. When Mapp provided a forum-the pretrial motion to
40 Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463
(1980); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
41 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
42 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
43 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).
44 Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct 1160 (1987).
45 See generally Loewenthal, Evaluating the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 49
UMKC L. REV. 24 (1980).
46 For a review of this conflict see Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1987).
47 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
48 See Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. LJ. 253 (1982).
49 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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suppress-and a potentially conviction-barring remedy, it was pre-
dictable that defense counsel would not be slow to assert their cli-
ents' right to exclude evidence acquired by unreasonable search or
seizure. From this perspective the exclusionary rule emerges as the
driving force behind the remarkable elaboration of privacy doctrine
following the Mapp decision.
Finally, Mapp's place in the history of the "incorporation" de-
bate is not without significance. Although the rights of criminal de-
fendants guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, sixth and eighth
amendments could have been selectively incorporated in any order,
the dam was in fact broken when the Court in Mapp declared the
fourth amendment's exclusionary rule binding upon the states.
Thus, although Mapp had its antecedents, it is accurate to say that
the modern era of constitutional protection of the rights of the ac-
cused began with the Court's five-four decision in the Mapp case.
Because Wolf v. Colorado50 had, twelve years before Mapp, ex-
pressly declined to "incorporate" the exclusionary rule within the
due process "core of the fourth amendment.., the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police," 5' the task con-
fronting the Mapp majority was to provide a convincing doctrinal
and political basis for repudiating Wolf. If the most formidable ob-
stacles to exclusion-a natural reluctance to bar reliable evidence of
guilt from a criminal trial and a structural reluctance to impose na-
tional standards on unwilling states-could be persuasively over-
come, the Wolf precedent would easily collapse. A durable case for
the exclusionary rule, therefore, could only be built upon regard for
privacy itself. A society that prized individual privacy enough would
willingly sacrifice both the convictions that exclusion might bar and
the state autonomy that a uniform rule would compromise. At bot-
tom, no remedy is stronger than the values it protects. To the ex-
tent that privacy is deemed appropriately subordinated to crime
control, the exclusionary rule cannot, and should not, endure.
Mr. Justice Clark's opinion for the Court in Mapp fails so utterly
to make the case for individual privacy that one is forced to question
the depth of his commitment to the value of that right. Further in-
vestigation seems to confirm the suspicion that his true sentiments
lay with its natural opponent-the power of law enforcement of-
ficers to search and seize at the margin of their constitutional au-
thority. In the six years he remained on the Court following the
Mapp decision, only in the last fourth amendment criminal case in
50 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
51 Id. at 27.
1112 [Vol. 79
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which he participated did Justice Clark vote in favor of the right of
privacy. 52 Even that decision, Berger v. New York, 53 may be viewed as
a primer addressed to Congress on the essential elements of a con-
stitutional statute authorizing warranted electronic eavesdropping-
instructions that Congress was soon to follow in Title II of the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.54 Between Mapp
and Berger, Mr. Justice Clark consistently sided with the opponents
of privacy and, out of fourteen non-unanimous privacy decisions, 55
four times made a majority to limit privacy over the dissent of his
colleagues from the Mapp majority.56
It is fair to conclude that despite its unequaled significance in
the history of fourth amendment doctrine, the values expressed in
the opinion in Mapp v. Ohio 57 found no home in the heart or mind of
its author.
A subtler and more profound change in constitutional doctrine
accompanied the shift from Wolf to Mapp, a change not in the reme-
dies available to criminal defendants but in the nature of the sub-
stantive constitutional limitations on state criminal prosecutions.
Before Wolf, a state criminal defendant was entitled under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to a trial that was "fun-
damentally fair." 58 A conviction that failed to meet that minimal
standard plainly could not stand; the remedy, reversal, entailed no
additional judgment.59 Wofposed two questions about the relation-
ship between constitutionally protected privacy and state prosecu-
tions. Logically anterior to the question of remedy was the question
of content: what rules should govern searches and seizures by state
52 Justice Clark voted with the majority in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), a substantive right of privacy decision.
53 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1968).
55 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 321 (1966)(Clark, J., dissenting); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965);
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 92
(1964)(Clark, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Rugendorfv. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 92 (1963)(Clark, J., dis-
senting); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S.
139 (1962).
56 Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757; Rugendorf, 376 U.S. 528; Ker, 374 U.S. 23; and Lanza, 370
U.S. 139 (4-3 decision).
57 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
58 E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
59 Thus, it was only after Mapp and Ker that the Court began to consider whether the
denial of a constitutional right could be deemed "harmless." Fahy v. Connecticut, 375
U.S. 85 (1963); see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1979).
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enforcement agents-fundamental fairness" or the rules applicable
to a "prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the
United States"? 60
It is fitting thatJustice Frankfurter should express for the Court
the judgment of post-World War II America in favor of the right of
the individual.
The knock at the door, whether by day or night, as a prelude to a
search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the po-
lice, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned
as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the
history and basic constitutional documents of English-speaking
peoples. 6l
It did not follow, however, as Mr. Justice Murphy's dissent dis-
ingenuously asserted, that "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
activities which are proscribed by the search and seizure clause of
the fourth amendment." 62 Instead, Wolf incorporated only "the
core of the fourth amendment": "the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . is . . . 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause." 63 Had Wolf not rejected
the exclusionary rule, the Court would soon have been called upon
to specify the scope and content of this new "core of privacy" right.
Instead, the right sought first to complete itself by evolving its miss-
ing remedy. Thus, the standard view of the doctrine between Wolf
and Mapp defines the uncertain right in terms of the remedy of ex-
clusion.r 4 The morphine capsules pumped from Mr. Rochin's stom-
ach were excluded to deny "brutality the cloak of law," 65 but the
bedroom conversations electronically seized from Mr. Irvine 66 and
the blood sample drawn from Mr. Breithaupt's unconscious per-
son67 remained admissible. As Professor Francis Allen put it at the
time, "the discrepancy between right and remedy bedeviled the ca-
reer of Wolf and left this area of due-process doctrine in a state of
unstable equilibrium." 68
The obstacle to equilibrium was not the exclusionary rule; as
suggested, exclusion and reversal are natural judicial responses to
60 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 26 (1949).
61 Id. at 28.
62 Id. at 41.
63 Id. at 27-28.
64 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 11-12 (2d ed. 1987).
65 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
66 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
67 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
68 Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wof, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
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prosecutions procured by means that are not "fundamentally
fair." 69 Contrary to the standard view of the Woif-Rochin-Irvine epi-
sode, it was the right itself, not the remedy, that "due process" doc-
trine could not easily absorb. Due process rights, then and now, are
always "complete" rights, in that such rights invariably consist of
both a "violation" and an intolerable degree of "harm" to the ac-
cused. For example, to exclude testimony by an eyewitness on due
process grounds requires showing both that the confrontation with
the accused was "unnecessarily suggestive" (the violation) and that
there was a consequent "substantial likelihood of misidentification"
(the harm).70 Similarly, the prosecution's failure to disclose excul-
patory evidence to the defense (the violation) does not offend due
process "unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial"
(the harm).71 Privacy rights are wholly different. Even the violation
of a right of privacy at the due process "core" of the fourth amend-
ment does not entail the sort of "harm" that makes a conviction
"fundamentally unfair."
Yet it is unarguably true that "the security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police .... is basic to a free soci-
ety."' 72 Escape from Wolf's dilemma thus lay only in two possible
directions: either, (1) the Court could define the privacy right to
include only such egregious intrusions that "harm" could be sensed
if not demonstrated; or, (2) it could abandon "harm" and rest exclu-
sion solely on the violation of the defendant's right of privacy.
"The Irvine case is of critical importance in the history of the
Wolf doctrine," as Professor Allen early observed, 73 because it sig-
naled rejection of the first option by refusing to extend Rochin v.
California 74 to non-violent "police measures .. .that ... flagrantly,
deliberately, and persistently violated the fundamental principle de-
clared by the Fourth Amendment." 75
A constitutional basis for the exclusion of illegally seized evi-
dence in state prosecutions could not be found in "due process"
69 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.
70 Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)
71 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). Thus, in United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667 (1985), the Court acknowledged that "the standard of review applicable to the
knowing use of perjured testimony is equivalent to the Chapman harmless error stan-
dard." Id. at 680 n.9. See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)(pre-indict-
ment delay violates due process only where delay unnecessary and prejudicial to
defendant).
72 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)(emphasis added).
73 Allen, supra note 68, at 7.
74 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
75 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 132 (1954).
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alone because, as the Court later stated, "the protections of the
fourth amendment ...have nothing whatever to do with the fair
ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial."' 76 Only by "incorporat-
ing" the fourth amendment could exclusion be based, as it was in
federal prosecutions, upon the bare violation of the defendant's
"right . . . to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures. "77
Severing the violation from the harm was a momentous step. It
was both the cause and the effect of the extension of the fourth,
fifth, 78 sixth 79 and eighth80 amendments as limitations on state crim-
inal processes. Thus augmented, "due process" was able to em-
brace respect for individual dignity, equality and privacy in addition
to the "fair ascertainment of truth." The exclusionary remedy, how-
ever, meant that these values could be assured only by sacrificing
reliable evidence of guilt and thus affronting, in the view of its crit-
ics, the demand for effective crime control.
Mapp thus thrust to the political foreground the tensions inher-
ent in the protection of privacy and exposed the contradiction that
Wolf had avoided: the enforcement of a right "basic to a free soci-
ety" 8' that had "nothing whatever to do with the fair ascertainment
of truth .... "82 Fashioning a rationale that could harmonize these
opposing values, override state autonomy and placate law enforce-
ment interests was a task that even a committed spokesman for a
Court united behind a single constitutional theory would find chal-
lenging. That it was undertaken by a divided Court on a theory that
commanded only four votes in an opinion by a Justice whose com-
mitment to privacy was at best halfhearted would seem to have ren-
dered the task impossible had it not been accomplished.
The fragility of Mapp was soon apparent. In his remaining ten
years on the Court, Justice Black voted in favor of individual privacy
in only six8 3 of forty-four fourth amendment cases decided by a di-
vided Court. Thus, by the 1964 term, Justices Clark and Black had
abandoned the Mapp majority and thereafter became increasingly
76 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973).
77 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 132.
78 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
79 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
80 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
81 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656.
82 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973).
83 See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387
U.S. 523 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 773 (1966)(Black, J., dissent-
ing); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965)(Black, J., dissenting); Fahy v. Con-
necticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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critical of decisions enforcing or enhancing fourth amendment pro-
tection.8 4 In Berger v. New York, 85 Justice Black justified his literalist
interpretation of the fourth amendment that words are not things
that can be "seized" by arguing that "eavesdroppers are not merely
useful, they are frequently a necessity [in dealing] with such speci-
mens of our society [as] bribers, thieves, burglars, robbers, rapists,
kidnappers and murderers,"8 6 and announced that:
I continue to believe that the exclusionary rule formulated... in the
Weeks case is not rooted in the Fourth Amendment but rests on the
supervisory power of this court. [I]n Mapp... the close interrelation-
ship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ... as they applied to
the facts of that case required the exclusion there of the unconstitu-
tionally seized evidence.8 7
In Davis v. Mississippi,88 Justice Black accused the majority of"so
widely blowing up the Fourth Amendment's scope that its original
authors would be hard put to recognize their creation."89 Reflect-
ing the same attitudes that had the previous year produced the Om-
nibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,90 he announced
that:
[I]t is high time this Court, in the interest of the administration of
criminal justice made a new appraisal of the language and history of
the Fourth Amendment and cut it down to its intended size. Such a
judicial action would make our cities a safer place for men, women and
children to live.9 '
Thus, on the eve of the Burger Court, amid a rising tide of fear
of "crime in the streets," the counter-attack on the exclusionary rule
began. Predictably, it focused on Mapp's vulnerable doctrinal foun-
dation and on the price exacted by the exclusion of reliable evidence
of guilt. Earlier in the Term, Justice Black had insisted that the rule
had "one primary and overriding purpose, the deterrence of uncon-
stitutional searches and seizures by the police."9 2 Thereafter, oppo-
nents of exclusion would argue, with increasing success, that the
rule should not apply when its use could not be shown to yield a
significant marginal deterrent effect. "The application of the rule,"
84 Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
85 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
86 Id. at 73.
87 Id. at 76, n.3.
88 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
89 Id. at 729.
90 Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order",
67 MIcH. L. Rev. 455 (1969).
91 Id. at 730.
92 Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 238 (1969)(Black,J., dissenting).
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the Court said in United States v. Calandra93 "has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most effica-
ciously served."
In 1971, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Black and
Blackmun, chose the unlikely vehicle of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,94 in which the majority held that a
violation of the fourth amendment gave rise to a federal cause of
action for damages, to argue in dissent that the "suppression doc-
trine" should be supplanted by federal and state statutory damage
actions.95 The dissent in Bivens marked a new, open phase in the
campaign against the exclusionary rule. Thereafter, every remedy
case that came before the Court became an occasion to restrict the
application of the exclusionary rule,96 culminating in the "good
faith" exception for searches conducted pursuant to a defective war-
rant or a statute later found to be unconstitutional. 97
III. THE TRANSFORMATION AND RETRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The liberal vision of the fourth amendment was enacted by
three Court decisions during that remarkable era known as The Six-
ties. Mapp began the process of transformation by "incorporating"
the exclusionary rule as a due process-mandated remedy for viola-
tions of the amendment. 98 In 1963, Ker v. California99 confirmed
what Mapp had suggested but could not hold: the content of the
incorporated right was identical to the rules applicable in a federal
prosecution, a result reached with no more judicial finesse than its
author, Mr. Justice Clark, had displayed in his opinion in Mapp.
Completing the structure was the Court's decision, in 1967, in Katz
v. United States,'00 which supplied the analytic framework for deter-
mining the scope of the amendment. The finished vision thus en-
93 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
94 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
95 Id. at 411, 427, 430 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Black, J., dissenting)(Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
96 E.g. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90
(1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S.
620 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974).
97 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160
(1987).
98 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
99 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
100 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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compassed any intrusion upon an individual's "reasonable"
expectation of privacy, judged such intrusions against the rigorous
content rules developed in federal proceedings, and punished any
violation by exclusion of the ill-gotten product, both to deter future
violations and to assure the integrity of the judicial process. The
Court generously bestowed access to the protection by the "stand-
ing" rules it announced in Jones v. United States 10 1 in 1960.
The retransformation of the amendment began almost immedi-
ately. 102 Opposition to the Court's "liberal" decisions enlarging the
rights of persons suspected or accused of crime was a major plank in
the 1968 presidential campaign of Richard Nixon. In 1969, Nixon
appointed Warren Burger to replace retiring ChiefJustice Earl War-
ren, and Justice Fortas' resignation the following year made room
for the appointment ofJustice Blackmun. In January, 1972, Justices
Powell and Rehnquistjoined the Court, replacingJustices Black and
Harlan, who had retired following the end of the previous Term.
The Warren Court decisions of the Sixties provided the doctri-
nal chrysalis for the retransformation of the fourth amendment in
the Seventies and Eighties. Katz had abandoned "constitutionally
protected areas" and embraced "expectation of privacy" as the
touchstone for determining whether an act or intrusion by govern-
ment agents constituted a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning
of the fourth amendment. Further, the strength and weakness of
that new standard-its ability to accommodate but not to resolve the
clash between opposing interests in crime control and privacy-had
been eloquently described only a year earlier, in Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion in United States v. White.103 There, responding to
the majority's assertion that the defendant had assumed the risk that
an undercover agent might secretly transmit their conversation, he
said:
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections
of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and
present. Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as
mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expecta-
tions and risks without examining the desirability of saddling them
upon society. The critical question, therefore, is whether under our
system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should im-
pose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.10 4
Moreover, the implications of Katz for the "standing" doctrine,
101 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
102 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 360-62.
103 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
104 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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although not fully articulated until 1978 in Rakas v. Illinois,105 had
begun to affect the formulation of the "standing" inquiry: standing
depended on whether, as the Court said in Mancusi v. DeForte,106 the
defendant had "a reasonable expectation of freedom from govern-
mental intrusion"' 0 7 in the union office from which the records
sought to be suppressed were seized.
The doctrine was similarly prepared for the retransformation of
the content of the fourth amendment-the rules for determining
whether action within its scope was or was not "reasonable"-from
a "monolithic" requirement of probable cause and a warrant to a
scheme in which the predicate for any particular intrusion varied ac-
cording to the severity of the intrusion and the relative strength of
the opposing law enforcement and privacy interests. After Camara v.
Mun. Court 108 and Terry v. Ohio, 109 neither warrants nor searches and
seizures invariably entailed probable cause or even individualized
suspicion.
Finally, Chief Justice Burger had, in the October 1971 Term,
initiated the attack on the exclusionary rule that would culminate
thirteen years later in the so-called "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule established in United States v. Leon 1"0 and Massachu-
setts v. Sheppard. "'
The mysterious aspect of judicial doctrine-making is the pro-
cess by which national values are mediated by the incumbent jus-
tices of the Supreme Court. President Nixon undoubtedly expected
his appointees to render the Constitution more favorable to the col-
lective interest in crime control and thus to subordinate the privacy
and autonomy of the individual where those interests were in con-
flict. If the Burger Court were so minded, as it convened for the
first time in full strength in the winter of 1972, it had the doctrinal
tools at hand.
That the Court has increasingly restricted the breadth of the
fourth amendment's protection is indisputably evident from the
doctrinal record. With a few exceptions, 112 in every decision con-
105 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
106 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
107 See Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism and the Civil Liberties, 45 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1950).
108 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
109 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
110 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
111 468 U.S. 981. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. at 411 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
112 The exceptions are: (1) Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987)(moving stereo to
observe serial number constituted a "search"); (2) United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
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cerning the scope of the amendment since Katz v. United States 1"3 the
Court has found the challenged "intrusion" to be outside the pro-
tection because the government activity did not amount to a
"search" or "seizure" that "violated" a "protected," "reasonable"
or "legitimate" "expectation of privacy" in the "persons, houses,
places or effects" of a person with "standing."'" 14
The Court's preference for crime control values is less apparent
in its decisions affecting the content of the fourth amendment. Of
the one hundred and ten such cases decided since Mapp, the split is
roughly three to two in favor of the power to search and seize. Be-
neath the raw numbers, however, a powerful and undeniable prefer-
ence for collective security over individual privacy may be discerned.
A number of the content decisions that opt for privacy at the
margin have since been abandoned 15 or drastically limited. 11 6
537 (1982)(applying Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), to cases pending on
direct appeal on the date Payton was decided, and generally adopting Mr. Justice
Harlan's views on the "retroactivity" of the Court's decisions; (3) Torres v. Puerto Rico,
442 U.S. 465 (1979)(affirming that the fourth amendment applies to Puerto Rico);
(4) Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)(rejecting the doctrinally bizarre notions,
apparently unique to Mississippi, that the fourth amendment does not apply to the "in-
vestigatory stage" or to "trustworthy" evidence such as fingerprints); (5) Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)(union official had "standing" to object to the seizure of
records in his custody that were seized from an office he shared with other officials);
(6) Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968)(acquiescence to a claim of authority
to search pursuant to a warrant not sufficient to show voluntary consent).
As this list indicates, questions of retroactivity and consent are treated here as af-
fecting the scope of the fourth amendment, although both exert far less influence on the
reach of the amendment than do the more typical "definitional" scope elements of
"search," "seizure," and "expectation of privacy." Valid consent to a search or seizure
affects the scope of privacy at two levels. It operates to defease the protection the
amendment would otherwise provide in the absence of such consent. More generally,
the doctrinal criteria for a valid consent operate to contract or expand the scope of the
amendment by easing or retarding such defeasance. As Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 242 (1973), illustrates, those criteria are important to the de facto scope of
privacy, and they respond to the same political considerations that actuate the Court's
definitional scope decisions.
Retroactivity decisions, although the least significant of the doctrines that restrict
the scope of the right, have played an important symbolic role in post-Mapp fourth
amendment jurisprudence. The device was created (or at least reincarnated), one will
recall, to deny application of the exclusionary rule to cases already "final" on the date
Mapp was decided. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
113 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
114 These developments are examined in detail in section IV.
115 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) and Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968)(distinguished and abandoned in Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970)); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393
U.S. 410 (1969)(explicitly abandoned in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)); Robbins
v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981)(abandoned in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982)).
116 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S.
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Others simply reaffirm established principles, applying them to rela-
tively uncontroversial fact situations. 17 Several of the Court's con-
tent decisions side with privacy values on the merits of the particular
dispute, but introduce doctrine that, generally applied, increases the
government's power to search and seize legitimately. 18 Although
753 (1979)(limited by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) and United States v.
Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985)); Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971)(potentially lim-
ited by the "good faith" exception of Leon-Sheppard); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968)(limited by Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)).
117 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965)(general search warrant which does not
describe with particularity things to be seized an unconstitutional "general warrant");
James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965)(per curiam)(search of arrestee's home two blocks
from scene of arrest beyond the zone lawfully searched incident to arrest); Sabbath v.
United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968)(applying knock-and-announce statute to arrest);
Recznik v. City of Lorain, 393 U.S. 166 (1968)(per curiam) (defendant's home not ren-
dered a "public place" by presence of a large number of persons on the premises);
Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977)(per curiam) (magistrate with financial incentive
to grant search warrants not "neutral and detached"); Lo-Ji Sales Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319 (1979) (magistrate who participated in execution of general search warrant not
neutral and detached; warrant to seize two films and "similarly obscene materials" an
unconstitutional general warrant); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)(groundless stop
violates fourth amendment); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)(arrest without prob-
able cause occurred when police seized airline passenger's luggage and passenger was
not free to leave interrogation room).
118 Although Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v.
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), brought administrative inspections within the scope of the
fourth amendment (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had
deemed non-criminal searches "peripheral" to the concerns of the amendment), the de-
cisions in these cases, together with the stop-and-frisk decisions the following Term,
introduce into fourth amendment doctrine the idea of "variable content"-the notion
that the predicate for a search or seizure may vary according to the Court's assessment
of the degree of intrusiveness it entails. Camara and See, for example, permit fire, health
and housing code inspections pursuant to a warrant issued solely on a showing that the
particular inspection falls within a reasonable legislative or administrative program for
the periodic inspection of similar premises. Despite Justice Stevens' insistence, in Mar-
shall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978)(Stevens, J., dissenting), and the "fire
scene" cases, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512 (1978)(Stevens, J., concurring) and
Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 299 (1984)(Stevens, J., concurring), that warrants
may only be issued on probable cause, those cases permit occupational safety inspec-
tions and fire scene investigations under warrants issued without "individualized suspi-
cion" but solely on a showing of compliance with reasonable legislative or
administrative standards.
Similarly, although Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) held that an automo-
bile could not be stopped without "reasonable suspicion" (the Terny predicate), its dic-
tum approving roadblock stops of all motorists pursuant to administrative regulations
has proved to be the more influential feature of the decision. See, e.g, Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730 (1983).
See also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980), in which the Court found the
government's search of misdelivered goods to a third party unreasonable, but planted
the suggestion that the fourth amendment would not be implicated if the agents had
merely replicated the scope of the private search conducted by the third party, a notion
that became the holding of United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States
v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)(holding that detention of defendant's luggage for 90 min-
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some of the remaining twenty cases establish or confirm important
limitations on governmental power to invade privacy,'1 9 they are
plainly eddies in a gathering current that flows strongly in the oppo-
site direction.
As the most politically vulnerable component of the protection,
the exclusionary remedy has been both directly limited 120 and
shamelessly exploited as a basis for limiting the scope, 21 and con-
tent1 22 of the amendment. Recently, however, the indirect assault
utes exceeded the authority derived from investigative detention, but reaching out to say
that exposing the luggage to a narcotics detection dog was not a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment); and Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985) (re-af-
firming Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), but suggesting that a warrant to detain
for fingerprinting might be based on less than probable cause to arrest and that field
detention for fingerprinting on "reasonable suspicion" was supported by case law).
119 Cases limiting the zone of a search incident to arrest include: Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970); and Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Cases limiting searches and stops near international
borders include: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v.
Oritz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); and Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
Cases limiting the power to enter a residence to effect an arrest include: Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); and Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Cases limiting entry and search of fire and homicide
scene include: Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984); Thompson v. Louisiana, 469
U.S. 17 (1984)(per curiam); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); and Mincey v. Ari-
zona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (predicate beyond probable cause and a
warrant required for surgical search of accused); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. I
(1985)(deadly force may not be used to seize fleeing felon unless probable cause exists
to believe that suspect poses threat of great bodily harm to arresting officer or others);
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)(probable cause required for detention for
custodial interrogation indistinguishable from traditional arrest); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979)(presence in tavern subject to search warrant not a sufficient predicate for
search or frisk of patron); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)(permitting challenge
to a facially valid affidavit on a substantial preliminary showing of probable cause based
on knowing or reckless false statement); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)(requir-
ing an ex parte judicial determination of probable cause as a predicate for post-arrest
detention); United States v. United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S.
297 (1972)(declining to exempt from the warrant requirement electronic surveillance of
domestic organizations ordered by the President on national security grounds).
120 Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987); I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032
(1984); Massachusets v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984); Cardwell v. Taylor, 461 U.S. 571 (1983)(per curiam); Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90 (1980); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980); United States v. Havens,
446 U.S. 620 (1980); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v.
Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
121 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978); United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531 (1975), especially Justice Brennan's dissent, Peltier, 422 U.S. at 561-62 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973)(Powell, J.,
concurring).
122 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 97 (1979)(Burger, CJ., dissenting); Illinois v.
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on the exclusionary rule appears to have been deflated by the suc-
cess of the direct attack.
Fourth amendment doctrine sometimes appears to be an elabo-
rate structure ofjury-rigged accommodations between collective se-
curity and individual privacy in which each doctrinal component is
constantly in danger of collapsing into an undifferentiated inquiry as
to whether the official conduct was "reasonable." The "good faith"
exception is an obvious and dramatic example of this tendency of
the fourth amendment to slump toward the textual minimum as it
absorbs the stresses imposed by the clash between collective and
individual "rights."
Whether the Court's decisions in Gates, Leon, and the "scope"
cases examined in this essay simply relieve the stress that actuates
this inclination toward more flexible limits on law enforcement or
whether, on the other hand, they signal a further and perhaps com-
plete deterioration of the categorical structure of fourth amendment
doctrine, will depend on society's commitment to the value of indi-
vidual privacy. Heightened fear of crime or terrorism or drug use
will inevitably reduce the zone of privacy that individuals allow each
other, and the fourth amendment cannot protect us from ourselves.
Thus, pursuing the question, for example, of whether Leon will
remain an "exception" or be so broadly applied that it supplants the
"rule" soon transforms the technical assessment of the exclusionary
rule into a speculative inquiry that is more political than doctrinal.
The legal analyst walks a narrow path in this realm. To fail to recog-
nize the political foundations of the doctrinal choices would give
one the distorted view of a pre-Galilean astronomer; but even the
right perspective does not entitle one to render cosmic judgments
about phenomena beyond one's powers of observation.
My solution is to acknowledge that the doctrine follows a politi-
cally centered orbit and to assert that for the past fifteen years the
Court's fourth amendment decisions have consistently, though not
invariably, favored the state's power to intrude, at the margin of its
authority, over the individual's assertion of a right to freedom from
such intrusion.
IV. THE SCOPE OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The challenge to one who would understand the scope of the
fourth amendment lies in solving the puzzle of its analytic redun-
dancy. All of the major concepts from which its scope is formed-
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see United States
v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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search, seizure, legitimate expectation of privacy, consent, and
standing-beg the ultimate question of what sorts of official acts are
limited by the amendment's "reasonableness" stricture. There are
several possible interpretations. First, each of these rubrics may ex-
press separate aspects of the inquiry, reflecting the complexity and
significance of the Amendment's role in American society. Second,
the redundancy may reflect only circumstantial-not political-vari-
ations in the scope inquiry. Third, the redundancy may expose the
central core of the scope inquiry, yielding a more encompassing and
numinous quality from which these rubrics all derive. Finally, the
redundant categories may simply reflect a general antipathy toward
the protection of individual privacy, because each has been used by
the Court as yet another device for constricting the scope of the
fourth amendment.
This Article has dwelt long enough on the generalities of the
subject. Fourth amendment doctrine is generated to explain orjus-
tify the resolution of the endless variety of conflicts between individ-
ual privacy and collective security. It is from the study of those
practical accommodations that the nature of the fourth amendment
will emerge. Because a doctrinal system is built up from successive
layers, all of which must be rendered consistent with each additional
tier, the present task is best approached by the same route.
By the time of Katz, the conceptual apparatus it replaced had
already been stretched to the point of transparency. Silverman v.
United States 123 and Clinton v. Virginia 12 4 had reduced the require-
ment of "physical penetration" to little more than a metaphor. In
these cases and Wong Sun 125 the Court had applied the fourth
amendment to the seizure of a person's words or statement.
What is remarkable, however, is how little was changed by
Katz's abandonment of the "trespass" standard of Olmstead v. United
States 126 and Goldman v. United States 127. True, it changed the result
in the electronic surveillance cases. However, it did not bring the
use of sense enhancing devices within the scope of the amendment
as a general proposition. 28 Moreover, Katz had no effect on the
scope-narrowing doctrines of "plain view," "consensual encoun-
ter," "voluntary transfer," consent or abandonment. Indeed, the
123 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
124 377 U.S. 158 (1964)(per curiam).
125 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
126 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
127 316 U.S. 129 (1942)(These cases held wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping to
be outside the fourth amendment when accomplished without trespassing on the
surveilled premises.).
128 See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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main function of the expectation of privacy rubric minted in Katz
seems to have been to provide an additional ground for denying
fourth amendment protection by refusing "legitimacy" to assertions
of privacy in, for example, one's voice and handwriting, 29 bank
records, 3 0 open fields' 3 1 or any "private enclave" visible from pub-
lic airspace. 132
"Plain view," although sometimes misperceived as a content is-
sue, 133 in fact serves the extremely significant function of delineat-
ing the kinds of observations that are not "searches" and thus are
not within the protection of the amendment. When government
agents are in an area where they have a right to be, doing what they
have a right to do, the acquisition of information in "plain view"
does not constitute a "search."' 34 Moreover, if that information
provides a predicate for a seizure that can be accomplished without
engaging in conduct itself subject to protection-such as entering
private premises-the content rules allow the immediate seizure of
such material.13 5
The "plain view" rule works without complication when the of-
ficer is in a public place using his or her unaided senses. When the
officer's vantage point is from a private place, a predicate for his or
her presence is required. When sense enhancing equipment is used
to acquire a "plain view," the analysis shifts to the other side of the
equation. Instead of asking whether the official conduct was a
search, the question becomes whether that conduct violated a "le-
gitimate expectation of privacy." However this question is an-
swered, the conclusion completes the circle: that there was or was
not a "search."
It is invulnerably established by Berger and Katz that electronic
surveillance of conversations, without the consent of any party
thereto, constitutes a "search and seizure." It was to bring such
conduct within the reach of the fourth amendment that the "expec-
tation of privacy" rubric was coined. Although the Court has not
yet faced such a case, surely the same would be true of video
129 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19
(1973).
130 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
131 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
132 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
133 See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 778 (1983)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
134 y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 244 (6th ed.
1986).
135 Subject to first amendment limitations when books, movies, tapes or other forms





Recent attention has focused, however, not on indiscriminate
audio or video surveillance, but on devices that yield more limited
information about the individual's actions or possessions, including
electronic tracking beacons ("beepers") and discrete sensing de-
vices such as drug-sniffing dogs and other tests that reveal only the
presence or absence of illegal substances. Because the use of these
sorts of devices has an obvious impact on privacy but has, with one
empty exception,13 7 been ruled to be outside the scope of the fourth
amendment, detailed scrutiny of the Court's decisions in this area
may illuminate the larger topic.
A. THE "BEEPER" CASES
The first of these cases, United States v. Knotts 138 presented the
issue in its mildest form: whether the use of a beeper to track a five
gallon drum of chloroform from its place of purchase to defendant's
secluded cabin "violated [his] . . . rights secured by the Fourth
Amendment."13 9 The beeper-a radio transmitter that emits a peri-
odic signal-was placed in the drum with the consent of the seller
and was used to follow defendant's automobile. When visual and
electronic contact were lost, it located the drum when it came to rest
at defendant's theretofore unknown residence. Because the defend-
ant did not challenge the installation of the beeper or the transfer of
the drum containing it, only its use to track and locate the drum was
at issue. The Court's response was more confident than convincing.
The Court stated that "when [defendant] travelled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was travelling over particular roads in a particular direc-
tion . . .and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
136 People v. Teicher, 52 N.Y.2d 638, 422 N.E.2d 506, 439 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1981); see
United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 415 (1985).
137 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-18 (1984); see infra text accompanying
notes 165-182.
138 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
139 Id. at 277. It is worth emphasizing at the outset that to state the issue in this way
confounds scope and content: whether the fourth amendment has been "violated" de-
pends on whether it applies to the challenged conduct, and if so, whether any of the
rules governing the predicate for or limits on such conduct have been breached. Where,
as here, the "reasonableness" inquiry is forestalled by the conclusion that no "search"
or "seizure" occurred, it is analytically superfluous, and subtly misleading, to ask
whether the amendment has been "violated." The question, rather, is whether the con-
duct "implicates" or "affects" fourth amendment interests. As will be discussed, the
distinction becomes even more crucial when the scope inquiry turns on the defendant's
"standing" to invoke the protection, if any, of the amendment.
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public roads onto private property."1 40
Because visual surveillance would have revealed this same in-
formation, "scientific enhancement of [that capability] .. . raises no
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also
raise." 14 1 The public nature of defendant's activities was deemed to
put them beyond the protection of the amendment, and the govern-
ment's use of an electronic device to acquire no more information
than the defendant "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to
look" did "not alter the situation."1 42
On several grounds, this conclusion seems too easily reached.
In the first place, the beeper did serve a purpose that visual surveil-
lance could not have reproduced: it enabled the officers to locate
the drum in defendant's cabin after it was removed from the public
streets and from the vehicle in which it was transported. The
Court's assertion that "no .. .expectation of privacy extended to
the visual observation of [defendant's] .. .automobile arriving on
his premises after leaving a public highway, nor to movements of...
the drum ... outside the cabin in the 'open fields' "143 stretches the
"plain view" doctrine to include the observations of a hypothetical
as well as an actual observer. 144 This idea is utterly inconsistent with
the basic fourth amendment principle that an unreasonable search
or seizure cannot be rescued by the fact that it could have been reason-
ably conducted, for example, that because a warrant, if sought,
would have been granted it was permissible to act without a war-
rant. 145 The use of a hypothetical observer to remove surveillance
by beeper from the scope of the amendment is no more acceptable
than the use of a hypothetical warrant to salvage an intrusion that
violates its content. It is only less obvious. It has the same capacity
to nullify fourth amendment rights, for just as there is a "reason-
able" way to conduct every search, there are modes by which all
phenomena may be observed without "searching."
Suppose that Mr. Katz had placed his call from an unenclosed
public telephone of the sort that are rapidly replacing the classic
telephone booth. Because a person standing nearby could overhear
the user's conversation, does it follow that the government is free to
140 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-282.
141 Id. at 285.
142 Id. at 281-82.
143 Id. at 282.
144 See LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth AmendmentJurisprudence, 28
ARIZ. L. REv. 291 (1986), for criticism of the hypothetical observer in United States v.
Knotts and other "plain view" cases.
145 See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 14 (1982)(White, J., dissenting);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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use an electronic device to do the same thing? The argument for
such a result is not as farfetched as it may at first appear. The fact
that bystanders or, as in Knotts, other highway users, have no inter-
est in the information and have not in fact noted the words or route
of the defendant is apparently of no consequence. Whether there
has been a "search" or "seizure" does not depend, according to
Knotts, on the behavior of actual auditors or observers. What counts
is that the defendant "voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted
to look" or listen the information that the government has electroni-
cally acquired. The fourth amendment confers no right of anonym-
ity: if personal information is exposed to others and no privilege
protects it, those others may, and if subpoenaed must, disclose it to
government. 146
The power of the government electronically to acquire informa-
tion voluntarily exposed to an indifferent public finds support in
Katz itself. There the Court noted that the defendant "shut the door
behind him" to exclude "the uninvited ear ... not the intruding
eye... What a person knowingly exposes to the public.., is not a
subject of fourth amendment protection."'147 Therefore, the Court
in Knotts adds, the government may seize information thus exposed
by any such means as "science and technology [may] afford....
However, cannot the user of an unenclosed booth rely upon the fact
that there was no one within normal earshot when he or she spoke?
Perhaps he or she can. Perhaps also the highway traveller ought to
be able to rely on the fact that there were no vehicles in sight for
long stretches or when he or she turned onto private premises.
However, that is precisely the proposition that Knotts rejects without
a dissenting vote.
Although one may balk at the application of Knotts to surveil-
lance of conversations, the Court's reference to Smith v. Maryland49
adds strength to the conclusion that it is the fact of "voluntary" ex-
posure, not the limited character of the information, that rendered
the conduct beyond the scope of the amendment. In Smith, the
Court denied the legitimacy of the defendant's claimed expectation
of privacy in the numbers dialed from his home telephone. As in
146 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (1976);
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966); but f. United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 716 n.4. (1984)(Mere disclosure to another, however, does not extinguish the
right of privacy in the information disclbsed because "[tihere would be nothing left of
the Fourth Amendment right of privacy if anything that a hypothetical government in
power might reveal is stripped of constitutional protection." (Emphasis in original.)).
147 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 352 (1967).
148 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
149 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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United States v. Miller,'50 the defendant's "voluntary conveyance" of
the information to a bank or telephone company constituted an "as-
sumption of the risk" that it would be transmitted to the govern-
ment' 5 ' and "[we are not inclined to hold," the Court quoted from
Smith, " 'that a different constitutional result is required because the
telephone company has decided to automate.' "152 The point is not
that the monitoring of conversations is indistinguishable from elec-
tronic tracking. Instead the point, which will be addressed later, 53
is that whether information has been "knowingly exposed" cannot
be determined without at least implicit reference to the rules that
specify permissible surveillance techniques.
United States v. Karo,154 decided the following Term, moved sev-
eral magnitudes further in exempting the use of an electronic track-
ing beacon from scrutiny under the fourth amendment. The
government there obtained a court order authorizing the installa-
tion and monitoring of a beeper in a can of ether that was to be sold
to the defendants. The District Court later found the order invalid
because the government's affidavits contained deliberate misrepre-
sentations. The government did not challenge that ruling on ap-
peal. Thus, suppression of the information acquired by use of the
beeper could be avoided only by finding the activity beyond the
scope of the amendment-that is, neither a search nor a seizure.
The occasions for finding an intrusion governed by the amend-
ment were several. A search or seizure might have occurred:
(1) when the beeper was placed in the can prior to its delivery to
defendant; (2) when the encumbered can was transferred to defend-
ant Karo; (3) when the beeper was activated and used to follow Karo
from the point of purchase to his home; (4) when it was used to
verify that the can remained in Karo's home; (5) when it was used to
relocate the can after it had been moved, undetected, to the home of
defendant Horton, and, later, at the home of Horton's father;
(6) when it was used to discover, the following day, that the can had
again been moved; (7) when it was used to locate the can in a com-
mercial storage locker rented by Horton; (8) when it was used to
locate the can at another storage facility in a locker rented by de-
fendants Horton and Harley; (9) when it was used to track the can
150 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
151 Id. at 443; Smith, 442 U.S. at 744-45.
152 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283. Very recently, the Court used the same reasoning to deny
the existence of a "reasonable... expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an
area accessible to the public . . ." California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1629
(1988).
153 See supra notes 234-242 and accompanying text.
154 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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from the locker to the home of defendant Rhodes; (10) when it was
used to track the can from there to the house in Taos, New Mexico,
rented by defendants Horton, Harley and Steele, and thereafter
(11) to determine that the can was still inside the house. 155
Following these events, the agents "applied for and obtained a
warrant to search the Taos residence based in part on information
derived through use of the beeper. ' 156 The issue on the defend-
ants' motion to suppress the cocaine seized under the warrant was
whether the use of the beeper supplied information invalidated the
seizure. The Knotts rule exempting beeper surveillance that "re-
veal[s] . . . no information that could not have been obtained
through visual surveillance," eliminated from fourth amendment
concern the tracking described in items (3), (9) and (10). 15 7 The
remaining occasions may be conveniently discussed in three general
categories: the transfer to defendant of the can containing a gov-
ernment-planted beeper; its use to relocate the can in private lock-
ers and residences; and its use to determine the presence or absence
of the can in such places.
The Court held that the transfer to Karo of the can containing
an unmonitored beeper was neither a search nor a seizure. Its "po-
tential" to invade privacy was not sufficient to constitute a "search"
because "a holding to that effect would mean that a policeman walk-
ing down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of
picking up conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a
search even if the microphone were not turned on." 5 8 Nor was the
transfer a "seizure" because:
it cannot be said that anyone's possessory interest was interfered with
in a meaningful way. At most there was a technical trespass on the
space occupied by the beeper... [I]f the presence of a beeper in the
can constituted a seizure merely because of its occupation of space, it
would follow that the presence of any object, regardless of its nature,
would violate the fourth amendment.' 59
That the Court would so glibly dismiss the case for fourth
amendment limitations on the government's power to plant elec-
tronic tracking devices in private possessions is a discouraging re-
minder, if one were needed, of the low regard in which individual
privacy is now held. A case for the Court's conclusion could per-
haps be made on other grounds, including the discrete character of
155 Id. at 708-710.
156 Id. at 710.
157 Id. at 707.
158 Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
159 Id. at 712-713.
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the information sought (location) or the character of the substance
contained in the can (ether) or by more general assessment of "the
critical question . . . whether under our system of government, as
reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens the
risks of the electronic.., observer without at least the protection of
a [predicate] . . . requirement." 160
From this latter perspective, it is not at all self-evident that the
Court's hypothetical officer with a parabolic microphone "capable
of picking up conversations in nearby homes" poses a risk irrelevant
to the fourth amendment's concern for individual privacy. It is easy
to agree that the hypothetical homeowner has no fourth amendment
complaint against the unrealized threat to his or her privacy because
the threat is not sufficiently focused to give legal standing to any
particular homeowner. But the same cannot be said of a person
who receives a container in which government agents have planted
an electronic tracking beacon. If the fourth amendment exerts any
control over such conduct, the transferee has standing to invoke it.
That the amendment does limit the government's use of beepers is a
necessary implication of the Court's statement that the transferor's
"consent was sufficient to validate the placement of the beeper in
the can."' 6 1 Obviously, the Court's unstated assumption is that the
placing of a beeper-monitored or not-in a private container with-
out consent constitutes a search or seizure and thus falls within the
protection of the amendment.
Just who might have standing to assert that protection-as
owner or possessor of the container or the premises on which it is
located-is a subplot that provoked a lively debate between Justice
White and concurring Justice O'Connor. 162 But neither takes the
position that the owner or possessor of a beeper-encumbered
container lacks standing.' 63 The Court's hypothetical, therefore,
serves only to distract attention from the unexamined distinction on
which protection depends-the difference between "placing" a
beeper in a private container and "receiving" one in which a beeper
has already been placed. By manipulating three of the components
that affect the "scope" determination, "search," standing, and con-
sent, the Court is able to withhold fourth amendment protection
from the transferee (who seeks it) while granting it to the transferor
(who does not) without offering a reasoned justification for the
distinction.
160 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161 Karo, 468 U.S. at 711.




The Court's conclusion that the transfer of the container was
not a "seizure" illustrates another variety of analytic mistake (or tac-
tic, to the cynical observer): that of confounding the scope and the
content of the fourth amendment. Justice White's opinion for a six-
justice majority on the issue argues that no seizure occurred upon
transfer of the can containing the beeper because otherwise "it
would follow that the presence of any object, regardless of its na-
ture, would violate the Fourth Amendment." 164 Of course, it seems
ludicrous to suggest that the "presence" of any foreign object in a
container violates the fourth amendment. But it is not extravagant to
propose that when government contrives to place a tracking device
in a container to be transferred to an unwitting third party, its action
may implicate fourth amendment concerns sufficient to warrant the
Court's serious consideration whether such conduct ought to be en-
tirely free of constitutional restraint. Whether that object of itself or
because it is an electronic tracking beacon "violates" the amend-
ment is a content, not a scope, question. By confounding the issue,
Justice White's argument diverts attention from the beeper's threat
to privacy to the irrelevant proposition that not every unwanted ob-
ject placed in a container with the transferor's consent "violates"
the fourth amendment rights of the transferee.
What gives the majority opinion in Karo its apparent logic is the
Court's use of the form of analogic reasoning, a mode as familiar as
a lullaby to the common law mind. Because an unactivated eaves-
dropping device on a public street is not a "search," neither is a
tracking device placed inside a private container. Because receiving
a package in which government agents had placed a stone or a
feather would not be a "seizure," neither is receipt of a package
containing an electronic locater. The danger in reasoning from hy-
pothetical to actual results is that if the supposed facts are not true
to life, the judgment drawn from them will be equally artificial. By
the same token, if a particular result is sought, proxy facts sufficient
to the task can always be imagined unless limited by the require-
ment of plausibility.
Perhaps the flawed judgment that transfer of the beeper-en-
cumbered can entailed no search or seizure is rendered inconse-
quential by the Court's ensuing conclusion that "[T]he monitoring
of a beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual sur-
veillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a
justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence."' 165 For such a
164 Id. at 713.
165 Id. at 714.
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rule would seem to guarantee, as the government lamented, that
"[F]or all practical purposes they will be forced to obtain warrants in
every case in which they seek to use a beeper, because they have no
way of knowing in advance whether the beeper will be transmitting
its signals from inside private premises." 166
Although the Court responds that the burden of obtaining war-
rants when they are required "is hardly a compelling argument
against the requirement,"' 167 the Court's holding suggests that the
government's concern may be unfounded. The Court assumes that
"prior to its arrival at the second warehouse, the beeper was illegally
used to locate the ether in a house or other place in which [some of
the defendants] . . .had a justifiable claim to privacy."' 168 It holds
that the fourth amendment was violated when "the beeper was used
to locate the ether in a specific house in Taos, [New Mexico]."' 69
"Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn
from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy
interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of fourth amend-
ment oversight." 170
Thus, exclusion of the evidence can be avoided only if informa-
tion derived from the illegal use of the beeper was not necessary in
establishing probable cause for the warrant to search the Taos resi-
dence. Tracking the can from defendant Rhodes' home to "the im-
mediate vicinity of the Taos residence"' 7 1 falls, as we have seen,
within the Knotts' no-search ruling, as does the use of the beeper to
track the can from the second storage facility to Rhodes' home. 172
Only two further moves are required to divorce the tainted beeper
evidence from the warrant under which the cocaine was seized: first,
that the admittedly illegal monitoring prior to the can's arrival at the
second warehouse did not contribute to its discovery there, and,
second, that locating the can at the second warehouse was not itself
accomplished by illegal monitoring.
Meeting these conditions, however, would seem to be fore-
closed by the illegal monitoring that verified that the can was in
Karo's home, 173 relocated it in defendant Horton's home and, later,
Horton's father's home, 174 and the illegal monitoring that located
166 Id. at 718.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 720.
169 Id. at 714.
170 Id. at 716.
171 Id.





the can in the first storage locker. 175
The Court's cryptic conclusion to the contrary seems at first
reading completely arbitrary: "No prior monitoring of the beeper
contributed to [the] ... discovery... that it had been moved to the
second storage facility."' 176 Although the argument is entirely tacit,
the Court's reasoning appears to be as follows: If the beeper had
not been activated or monitored prior to its use to locate the can in
the second storage locker, obviously no "prior monitoring" could
have contributed to that discovery. Therefore, the actual prior
monitoring was irrelevant to the monitoring that located the beeper
in the second storage facility. The prior monitoring was constitu-
tionally insignificant, this argument concludes, because the beeper
would nonetheless have disclosed the can's location at the second
storage facility.
Only when the reasoning is made explicit does the defect in the
Court's argument become visible. All of the events prior to delivery
of the ether from defendant Rhodes' home to the Taos residence
took place in the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico. 177 If, after the
undetected removal of the can from the first storage facility, it had
been moved not to another Albuquerque storage facility, but to
Denver, St. Louis, Houston or any other location beyond the range
of the apparatus used to monitor the beeper, surveillance of the can
would have been permanently lost. Surveillance was again estab-
lished because the agents knew, from "prior monitoring," that Al-
buquerque was the place to seek the beeper's signal.178 Although
the range of the detection apparatus is not disclosed, the opinion
recites that "using the beeper, agents traced the beeper can to an-
other self-storage facility three days later."'179
The Court's treatment of the remaining issue-whether locat-
ing the can in the second storage locker by use of the beeper
amounted to illegal monitoring-demonstrates how easily a content
rule can be neutered by a scope rule that restricts or subverts its
application. The Court reasoned that using the beeper to locate the
second storage facility:
informed the agents only that the ether was somewhere in the ware-
house; it did not identify the specific locker in which the ether was
located. Monitoring the beeper revealed nothing about the contents
175 Item (7).
176 Id. at 720.
177 United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1437 (1983).
178 SeeJustice Stevens' dissenting opinion in Karo, 468 U.S. at 735, n. I I (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
179 Karo, 468 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added).
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of the locker that ... [defendants] had rented and hence was not a
search of that locker. The locker was identified only when agents trav-
ersing the public parts of the facility found that the smell of ether was
coming from a specific locker.' 80
It followed that no illegal monitoring contributed to the gov-
ernment's knowledge that the ether had been delivered to the Taos
premises and, the Court further found, that knowledge provided a
sufficient, untainted basis for the issuance of the warrant. 8 1
The life of a constitutional principle consists of the period be-
tween its announcement or "recognition" and its abandonment by
formal renunciation or doctrinal subversion. By this measure,
Karo's principle that electronic tracking of "property that has been
withdrawn from public view" is subject to "Fourth Amendment
oversight"' 182 ranks among the most ephemeral in recent memory,
having endured for only the few pages between its proclamation and
its application. Tracking by electronic beacon, Karo holds, does not
amount to a search until the government uses the device to establish
that the beeper-encumbered container is located in a particular pri-
vate place. So long as the government terminates its electronic
search at a point where at least one place other than the defendant's
house, apartment or locker may be the repository of the container,
no "search" within the fourth amendment has occurred. Govern-
ment agents informed of this limitation should have little difficulty
behaving or testifying accordingly.
That the majority did not deign to respond to dissentingJustice
Stevens' argument that "[w]ithout the beeper, the agents would
have never found the warehouse, and hence would never have set
up visual surveillance of the locker containing the can of ether"' 8 3
only strengthens the judgment that fourth amendment protection
against electronic tracking is wholly illusory.
B. DISCRETE SENSING DEVICES AND THE RE-SEARCH RULE
Like the electronic tracking beacon, a discrete sensing device
yields only limited information and is thus potentially distinguish-
able from the broad spectrum surveillance devices that Katz brought
within the reach of the fourth amendment. The use of a device to
detect only the presence or absence of cocaine or other contraband
even in a private place is exempted from fourth amendment scrutiny
180 Id. at 720-21.
181 Id. at 719.
182 Id. at 716.
183 Id. at 735 n.ll.
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because, the Court held in United States v. Jacobsen,'84 since "Con-
gress has decided ... to treat the interest in privately' possessing
cocaine as illegitimate," such an investigative technique "com-
promises no legitimate privacy interest."'' 15
The immense legal and social implications of exempting contra-
band sensing devices from constitutional oversight are belied by the
Court's cursory, almost offhand announcement of this doctrinally
novel proposition. Its genesis in United States v. Place 1 8 6 was, as dis-
senting Justice Brennan noted, "unnecessary to the judgment."1 87
There, Drug Enforcement Administration agents seized the luggage
of a passenger arriving at LaGuardia Airport on "articulable suspi-
cion" that it contained contraband, informing him that a warrant to
search it would be sought. Instead, the agents took the luggage to
Kennedy Airport where a dog trained to detect narcotics reacted
positively to one of the bags. The Court held that, under Terry v.
Ohio,188 luggage may be seized and temporarily detained, but that
"the 90-minute detention of respondent's luggage.., went beyond
the narrow authority possessed by police to detain briefly luggage
reasonably suspected to contain narcotics."' 189
Wedged between the two halves of the Court's ruling on the
content of the fourth amendment was its dictum concerning the
amendment's scope: "exposure of respondent's luggage, which was
located in a public place, to a trained canine ... did not constitute a
'search' . . . .190 The Court offered two reasons (and ignored a
third) for its judgment. Standard analysis would have assessed the
dog's use as a sense enhancing technique depending on whether it
seemed more like the electronic eavesdropping condemned in Katz
or the illumination by searchlight the Court held not a "search" in
United States v. Lee. 19' Although the Court's decisions provide no
satisfactory standard or analytic process for making this distinction,
the case law generally excludes from the scope of the amendment
ordinary means of enhancing the senses, such as flashlights and bin-
oculars, and includes within it, as the Court recently suggested,
"highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available
to the public."' 9 2 Perhaps because the police have long used dogs
184 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
185 Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
186 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
187 Id. at 719 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
188 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
189 Place, 462 U.S. at 710.
190 Id. at 707.
191 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927).
192 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
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for security and tracking purposes, most courts held or assumed,
prior to Place, that the trained canine sniff did not constitute a
search. '9 3
What Place suggested and Jacobsen confirmed was that the Katz-
Lee analysis applied only to broad spectrum sense enhancing de-
vices. Contraband-only sensing devices are per se exempt from
fourth amendment regulation because they "compromise... no le-
gitimate privacy interest." 19 4
Before addressing the implications of deregulating contraband-
only sensing devices, it will prove useful to trace a related doctrinal
strand that also culminates in Jacobsen-the "re-search rule." In
Walter v. United States, 19 5 decided four years earlier, the question was
whether the government's viewing of pornographic films that had
been misdelivered and turned over to the FBI was a "search." The
unwitting recipient had opened the packages and examined the film
containers which bore "explicit descriptions of the contents," but
did not view the films. 19 6 The four dissenting justices believed that
the "private search" by the recipient "so fully ascertained the nature
of the films ... that the FBI's subsequent viewing of the movies...
was not an additional search subject to the warrant requirement."' 19 7
The majority agreed that the judgment should be reversed, but
disagreed as to the effect of the private search. Justices Stevens and
Stewart argued that "surely the government may not exceed the
scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an in-
dependent search,"' 9 8 and ducked the question of "whether the
government would have been required to obtain a warrant had the
private party been the first to view them."' 99 Justices White and
Brennan sharply disagreed with "the notion that private searches
insulate from Fourth Amendment scrutiny subsequent governmen-
tal searches of the same or lesser scope." 200
In United States v. Jacobsen,20 1 Justices Stevens and O'Connor
joined the Walter dissenters to form a six justice majority adopting
precisely that notion. There, employees of a private carrier opened
a package damaged by a forklift "to examine its contents pursuant
193 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 367-68.
194 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
195 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
196 Id. at 652.
197 Id. at 663-64.
198 Id. at 657.
199 Id at 657 n.9.
200 Id. at 660.
201 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
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to a written company policy regarding insurance claims." 20 2 The
package-an ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper-
contained crumpled newspaper covering a ten inch tube made of
silver duct tape. A supervisor cut open the tube and found four
plastic bags containing several ounces of white powder. The Drug
Enforcement Administration was notified, but before its agents ar-
rived, the employees replaced the plastic bags in the tube and put
the tube and the newspapers back in the box. When a DEA agent
arrived, he found the box with the top open and the tube exposed.
He removed the four bags and conducted a field test that identified
the substance as cocaine. 20 3 As noted, the field test falls outside the
scope of the amendment because its ability to detect only the pres-
ence or absence of contraband does not affect a "legitimate" privacy
interest. 20 4 Nor did removal of the bags from the tube constitute a
"search," the Court held, because that conduct "enabled the agent
to learn nothing that had not previously been learned during the
private search. It infringed no legitimate expectation of privacy
"205
The impact ofJacobsen's twin holdings is potentially so destruc-
tive of constitutionally protected privacy that one is inclined to ac-
cept dissenting Justice Brennan's prediction that "this Court
ultimately stands ready to prevent this Orwellian world from coming
to pass." 20 6 The implications of the re-search rule are disturbingly
broad: as concurring Justice White noted, logically extended, the
proposition that a prior private search extinguishes the privacy in-
terest in a closed container would seem to include any case in which
a private party has knowledge that a container conceals contraband
and nothing else whenever, as inJacobsen, the private party has re-
vealed that information to government. Whether the private party's
knowledge be derived from a search, as inJacobsen, by observation
or "as a result of conversations with [the] . . . owner" of the
container,20 7 it is equally true that:
[o]nce frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs-[by
revealing that information to the government]-the Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit governmental use of the now non-private in-
formation... and the agent's visual inspection of [the container's]...
contents [would] enable ... the agent to learn nothing that had not
previously been learned during the private... [observation] ... and
202 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109, 111 (1984).
203 Id. at 111-112.
204 See supra note 194.
205 Id. at 120.
206 Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207 Id. at 133 (White, J., concurring in part).
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hence was not a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 20 8
The majority's attempt to avoid the logic of these implications
appears to rest entirely on the proposition that, in Jacobsen, "the
governmental conduct was made possible only because private par-
ties had compromised the integrity of this container." 20 9 Although
it is clear that the Court has foresworn extension of the Jacobsen logic
beyond its "private search" context, one is entitled to wonder about
the durability of a limiting principle that seems directly descended
from the Olmstead-Goldman protection of "constitutionally protected
areas" against "physical penetration" that Katz explicitly abandoned
two decades earlier.
Even more portentous are the implications of the Court's exclu-
sion from the fourth amendment of contraband-only testing devices.
Brave new worlds in which all passersby are scanned for drugs and
police cruising through residential neighborhoods probe all homes
with futuristic devices that disclose only whether the offending sub-
stance is present come quickly to mind. 210 In that future, as dissent-
ingJustice Brennan warned, "if the Court stands by the theory it has
adopted today, search warrants, probable cause and even 'reason-
able suspicion' may very well become notions of the past." 211
Of course, these implications could be abjured by a Court that
wished to avoid them. Jacobsen, after all, involved nothing more sin-
ister than a field test of a substance legitimately possessed by gov-
ernment which the Court was virtually certain "would result in a
positive finding." 21 2 "[Tihe likelihood that official conduct of the
kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any legitimate
interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the test-
ing as a search subject to the Fourth Amendment." 2 13
On the other hand, the Court's opinion clearly rests on the
broader proposition that "governmental conduct that can reveal
whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably private' fact,
compromises no legitimate privacy interest," 214and it cites Profes-
sor Loewy's unabashed defense of that proposition.2 15 Good sense
may overcome good logic, however, if the government should seek
208 Id. at 117.
209 Id. at 120 n.17.
210 Id. at 138 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 138.
212 Id. at 123.
213 Id. at 124.
214 Id. at 123.
215 Id. at 123 n.23 (quoting Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244-48 (1983)).
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to use such devices randomly to monitor private places. Indeed,
Karo's holding to that effect with respect to electronic tracking bea-
cons is directly on point.
There may, however, be another and more conclusive strategy
by which to sever Jacobsen's unacceptable implications from its hold-
ing. Because the agents had undeniable authority, under Texas v.
Brown,216 to seize the white powder with probable cause to believe
that it was associated with crime, the issue was whether a chemical
test to determine its composition-in the field or later in a labora-
tory-constituted a "search" for which some predicate was re-
quired. There is reason to conclude that the minute examination of
lawfully seized materials requires no separate predicate.21 7 It would
follow that Jacobsen's exemption from fourth amendment scrutiny of
all contraband-only testing devices is entirely gratuitous and unnec-
essary to the result in Jacobsen. In United States v. Edwards2 18 respon-
dent was arrested, charged with attempting to break into a post
office, and jailed pending arraignment. The following morning, the
clothing respondent had been wearing at the time of and since his
arrest was seized. "Examination of the clothing revealed paint chips
matching the samples' 21 9 taken from the crime scene. Although the
seizure was challenged (and ultimately upheld), neither the respon-
dent nor any court suggested that the examination of the seized ma-
terial was a "search" within the scope of the fourth amendment.
Similarly, in Cupp v. Murphy,220 the controversy was over
whether the seizure of material from a suspect's fingernails was per-
missible, not whether later analysis of that material (showing it to be
tissue, blood and fabric associated with the crime) constituted a
search. Nor is there any indication that a warrant was issued to ex-
amine the paint scrapings seized in Cardwell v. Lewis22 1 or the drugs
seized in any of dozens of prosecutions involving substances that
could be conclusively identified only by chemical or other testing
procedures. 222 In short, until Jacobsen, the Court's decisions uni-
formly assumed that lawfully seized material could be minutely ex-
216 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
217 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
218 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
219 Id. at 802.
220 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
221 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
222 See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); Florida v.
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730 (1983); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452




amined for fingerprints, fibers, narcotic content, and the like
without a warrant, subject to a few narrow exceptions. 223 The
Court's unexpected ruling that a field test for cocaine of material
lawfully seized in plain view constituted a separate search and
seizure is illuminated by the scope-content distinction. As noted,
prior decisions seem to have assumed that such testing is a permissi-
ble incident of the government's lawful possession of the substance
to be tested. 224 Thus microscopic, chemical or other scientific ex-
amination of seized materials-whether in the field or at the crime
lab-were assumed to be "reasonable," that is, in conformity with
the content rules of the fourth amendment.
If, however, as Jacobsen holds, scientific testing of lawfully seized
material amounts to an independent search and seizure, it follows
that a fresh predicate, or escape from the predicate requirement, is
called for. Jacobsen chooses the former route to justify the seizure
and the latter route to validate the search occasioned by the field
test: because possession of cocaine is illegal, a discrete test for its
presence or absence infringes no "legitimate" expectation of pri-
vacy, and because only a minute amount of the material was de-
stroyed, the seizure was de minimis. Neither of these doctrinal
novelties need have been invented, however, if the Court had in-
voked the established tacit rule that the power to conduct such tests
is conferred by the initial lawful seizure. The existence of this un-
stated rule is proved not only by its apparent application to a wide
variety of seizures but also by its exceptions.
The exceptions possess a common feature that Jacobsen lacks: a
compelling basis for requiring an additional predicate before per-
mitting a more intensive examination of lawfully seized material.
The examination of "books or other materials arguably protected by
the First Amendment" that have been seized on the basis of "disap-
proval of the message contained therein," 225 for example, requires a
warrant despite the government's lawful acquisition of packages
containing apparently obscene materials. 226 Similarly, lawful cus-
tody of an arrested or charged person is not a sufficient predicate
for a surgical or even a hypodermic search of the person in cus-
tody.2 2 7 The broadest exception requires a warrant to search
223 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977); see United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982).
224 See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.
225 Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 655 (1980).
226 Id. at 656.




opaque, unopened containers lawfully seized by and under the con-
trol of government officers, lest the auto exception devour the war-
rant requirement.228
Why then did the Court depart from its tacit rule, lump field
testing of material in a transparent package that was obviously con-
traband with the unrelated exceptions and then invoke novel doc-
trine to overcome the logical consequences of its reasoning?
Several reasons may be suggested. First, the field test was the only
feature of the agent's examination that exceeded the scope of the
private search, and, from that perspective, it appeared analytically
necessary to assess it as a potential "search" not validated by the
"re-search rule." Place, decided the previous Term, provided a con-
venient and decisive basis for the result: it "dictated" the conclu-
sion that, up to the point of the field test, no search had occurred.229
This explanation suggests that Jacobsen's exemption of contraband-
only testing devices from the fourth amendment was essentially a
doctrinal accident. A more cynical observer might suspect that the
Jacobsen rule grew out of a deliberate scheme to promote the Place
dictum to the status of a holding. Whatever the motivation, the re-
sult appears to be the consequence of two factors: the similarity be-
tween the facts of Jacobsen and the facts of Walter and the
government's decision, in Jacobsen, to argue for reversal solely in
terms of the scope, not the content of the fourth amendment.
In both Jacobsen and Walter a private search preceded the gov-
ernment's lawful acquisition of the offending material. In both the
private search did not conclusively establish that the material was in
fact contraband, but clearly did establish probable cause to believe
that it was "connected with crime"-thus providing the predicate
for a plain view seizure. Neither package could qualify for protec-
tion under Chadwick-Sanders' requirement that a warrant be obtained
to search lawfully seized opaque packages, 230 although for different
reasons. The film packages carried explicit descriptions of their
contents; the cocaine was in a transparent plastic bag. In both cases,
as Justice Stevens said in Walter v. United States, the outward appear-
ance of the package was "not sufficient to support a conviction....
Further investigation-that is to say, a search of the contents of the
films-was necessary in order to obtain the evidence which was to
be used at trial."'23 '
Does it follow that it was a "search" to conduct a field test for
228 See cases cited supra note 223.
229 United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984).
230 See cases cited supra note 223.
231 Walter, 447 U.S. at 654.
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cocaine of the white powder lawfully seized in plain view in Jacobsen?
If it was a search, the government argued, "law enforcement officers
would have to obtain literally thousands of additional warrants each
year."' 232 "[A]lthough the results of chemical analyses have been
used in countless narcotics prosecutions," the argument continued,
"we know of no other court that has ever suggested that the govern-
ment must have a warrant before it can perform such a test." 23 3 As
previously shown, a warrant may be unnecessary for one of two rea-
sons: either, as asserted in this Article234, because the power min-
utely to examine lawfully seized material inheres in the original
lawful seizure, or, as Jacobsen holds, because a test that reveals only
whether a substance is contraband is not a "search." It is to avoid
the Orwellian implications of this latter theory that this Article has
examined in such detail the alternative rationale.
The case for the alternative has several strengths. It is compati-
ble with the broadly shared understanding that, ordinarily, lawfully
seized material may be scientifically tested without a warrant. Only
Jacobsen contradicts this consensus, and there the government did
not propose nor did the Court consider and reject the alternative.
Moreover, the cases on which the government relied for its novel
rule support the alternative, not the Jacobsen, view.
From the beginning, the government sought reversal solely on
a "scope" theory.235 To remove fourth amendment scrutiny, it pro-
posed the expansive view that "[i]ndividuals simply do not use the
molecular structure of a chemical substance as a repository for their
secrets. '"236 But even if some chemical analyses "search," the gov-
232 Brief for United States at 18, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984)(No.
82-1167).
233 Id. at 18-19 (citing United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 927 (1982)). United States v. Russell, 655 F.2d 1261, 1263-1264 (D.C. Cir.
1981), modified on other grounds, 670 F.2d 323, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982); United
States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d
788, 790 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 834 n.8, 839 (5th Cir.
1980)(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d
646 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d
472, 474 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); United States v. Nieves, 609
F.2d 642, 644, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980); United States v.
Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d 169, 173-
175 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 491, 499-500 (3d Cir.
1979)(en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911 (1979); United States v. Crabtree, 545 F.2d 884
(4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308, 1312 (10th Cir. 1975). See also
People v. Adler, 50 N.Y.2d 730, 732 n.4, 409 N.E.2d 888, 891 n.4, 431 N.Y.S.2d 412,416
n.4, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
234 See supra text accompanying notes 217-224.




ernment's narrower, and winning, position was that contraband-
only tests invade no legitimate privacy interest.
None of the fourteen cases cited by the government supports
theJacobsen rule.237 Many of them, like Jacobsen, involved a field test
performed by a government agent on suspicious material uncovered
by a private carrier's search of a package consigned for delivery. In
no case was-the field test treated as an independent search. Instead,
the critical issues were whether the private search had been insti-
gated or participated in by the government to a sufficient extent to
constitute "state action," and whether the original seizure was law-
ful. The testing of material lawfully acquired by transfer from a
third party or by the seizure of apparent contraband in plain view is
tacitly assumed to be a permissible incident of such acquisition. No
defendant in any cited case even thought to challenge the field test
on grounds independent of the lawfulness of the original search that
exposed the material to be tested. The only cited case to mention
what later became the Jacobsen rule rejected it. "We will not deny
[defendant] a privacy interest solely on the often advanced principle
that one can have no legitimate property interest in contraband." 238
The discovery that the precedent on which the government re-
lied is contrary to the position urged upon and adopted by the
Court only deepens the mystery. What accounts for the attraction
of an unprecedented, sweeping exclusion of field testing from the
protection of the fourth amendment, accomplished with language
that would equally exclude far more intrusive monitoring of private
places with contraband-only testing devices?
A possible explanation may perhaps be found in the Court's
statement that "[iut is probably safe to assume that virtually all of the
tests conducted under circumstances comparable to those disclosed
by this record would result in a positive finding ... ."239 Because
this notion violates the fundamental maxim that a search cannot be
validated by what it turns up, the Court went on to say that even if
the test is negative it "compromises no legitimate privacy inter-
est." 240 Nonetheless, the likelihood of success may also be seen as
providing the predicate for a plain view seizure of the material to be
tested: it is obviously "connected with crime." However, if only
material that appears virtually certain to be contraband may be sub-
237 See cases cited supra note 233.
238 United States v. Barry, 673 F.2d 912, 918 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 927
(1982).




jected to a contraband-only testing procedure, it is the alternative,
not the announced, rule that governs.
The Court's decision in Arizona v. Hicks24 1 may be read to rein-
force this more limited view of the Jacobsen rule. There the issue was
whether police conducted a "search" when a stereo component was
moved in order to expose its serial number. Although such a
"search" could be said to reveal only whether the component was
stolen, "and no other arguably private' fact," and thus did not com-
promise a "legitimate" privacy interest,242 this reasoning is nowhere
suggested in the Court's opinion. Because there is no apparent dif-
ference between a test for stolen-not stolen and one for contraband-
not contraband, the distinction must lie elsewhere. One possibility
supports the alternative rationale: unlikeJacobsen, there was no ba-
sis for believing that the equipment was illegally possessed. Had
there been, it could have been seized in plain view and, Hicks
holds, 243 that predicate would also have justified the act of observ-
ing the serial number. Another possibility is that Jacobsen is the
product of, and applies solely to, the enforcement of the anti-drug
laws, although the Court has never explicitly endorsed a crime-spe-
cific approach to the fourth amendment.244
Because the field test entailed the destruction of a minute
amount of the substance seized, the Court held that it "did affect
respondents' possessory interests protected by the Amendment...
by ... convert[ing] what had been only a temporary deprivation...
into a permanent one." 245 This warrantless "seizure" is immedi-
ately deemed "reasonable" because it "could, at most, have only a
de minimis impact on any protected property interest." 246 But just
as there is no case law making the examination of legally seized
materials a "search," nor is there any precedent for the proposition
that the destruction of such material during an appropriate test con-
stitutes a "seizure." If, as in Jacobsen, the initial seizure of the mate-
rial tested was lawful, subsequent examination, including field and
lab testing, has always been assumed to be within the authority con-
ferred by that seizure and thus not to constitute a further search or
seizure for which some predicate or exception, such as de minimis,
must be found.
The Court's confusion is the product of its failure to distinguish
241 Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
242 Id. at 1153.
243 Id.
244 Kamisar, supra note 46, at 11-20.
245 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124.
246 Id. at 125.
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between the initial seizure and the later examination. This is illus-
trated by its attempt to limit the de minimis exception:
We do not suggest, however, that any seizure of a small amount of
material is necessarily reasonable. An agent's arbitrary decision to
take the 'white powder' he finds in a neighbor's sugar bowl or his
medicine cabinet, and subject it to a field test for cocaine, might well
work an unreasonable seizure.247
The supposed seizure would be "unreasonable" for the same reason
that the initial seizure in Jacobsen was not. Seizing the neighbor's
powder, under the supposed circumstances, would be arbitrary;
seizing the defendant's powder, under the Jacobsen circumstances,
would not be. If, as Texas v. Brown 248 holds, an opaque, tied-off bal-
loon may be seized in plain view because its appearance gave the
officer probable cause to believe it was "associated with crime,"
surely the same is true of the visible white powder seized in Jacobsen.
The important point, in any event, is that the discussion again con-
fuses scope (whether the field test was a search or seizure) with con-
tent (whether the initial seizure or'subsequent test was reasonable)
causing it to rest its otherwise unobjectionable result on the unnec-
essary contraband-only exemption, notwithstanding the potential of
that idea profoundly to alter the balance between individual privacy
and permissible government surveillance.
C. "OPEN FIELDS"
What the "open fields" cases have in common with the discrete
sensing and tracking device decisions is that each entails inquisitive
government activity that, non-technically, appears to be a search,
but which is deemed by the Court not to be a "search" within the
fourth amendment. This exclusion is accomplished under the Katz
formula simply by regarding as "unreasonable" the defendant's ex-
pectation that the government would not or should not engage in
such conduct.2 49 Apart from this similarity, however, it is obvious
that entry onto "open fields" and "visual inspection"-to use the
Court's euphemism-of such fields involve a much broader intru-
sion than the one-dimensional devices already discussed. An exami-
nation of the rationale for the exemption from constitutional
scrutiny of open fields thus may provide additional clues to the na-
ture of the fourth amendment and the riddle of its analytic
redundancy.
Although the Katz formula is sufficiently malleable to accommo-
247 Id. at 125-26 n.28.
248 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
249 See supra text accompanying notes 129-132.
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date any desired result, that very feature limits its capacity to per-
form convincingly legal doctrine's essential task: the translation of
subjective political judgments into legal judgments ostensibly de-
rived from objective legal principles.
In Oliver v. United States,250 for example, the issue was whether
the government's discovery of defendant's secluded marijuana
patch by trespassing on defendant's fenced, posted farm was subject
to fourth amendment restraint. "The correct inquiry," the Court
said, "is whether the government's intrusion infringes upon the per-
sonal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment." 25'
Having "reject[ed] the suggestion that steps taken to protect privacy
establish that expectations of privacy in an open field are legiti-
mate," the Court had no difficulty in finding "no basis for conclud-
ing that a police inspection of open fields accomplishes such an
infringement." 252 Perhaps to forestall the impression that open
fields had been unceremoniously muscled out of the fourth amend-
ment, the Court relied on an additional, redundant doctrinal basis
for its judgment: open fields are not within the text of the amend-
ment's protection of "persons, houses, papers, and effects." 253
The Court's use of the Katz formula in tandem with the textual
argument is instructive because it invites comparison between two
distinct and apparently opposing approaches to the definition of the
scope of the fourth amendment. These modes of thought may be
roughly styled physical or mechanical on the one hand, and psycho-
logical or conceptual on the other. The former model, exemplified
by Olmstead-Goldman, defines privacy in terms of places and things
and the penetration or acquisition thereof; the latter model, embod-
ied in Katz, transcends physicality and seeks to protect the "right" of
privacy by safeguarding "people not places." Each approach has its
limitations. The mechanical approach was too inflexible to include
nontrespassory electronic eavesdropping. The conceptual ap-
proach is so transparently malleable that it barely conceals the judi-
cial value judgment. When the strength of each approach is
harnessed to the other, however, it yields a doctrinal synergy that
appears both to compel and justify the result. Thus, in Oliver, the
mechanical "open fields" approach serves to rebut the defendant's
argument that "the circumstances of a search [of open fields] may
indicate that reasonable expectations of privacy were violated." 254
250 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
251 Id. at 182-83.
252 Id. at 183.
253 U.S. GONST. amend. IV.
254 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 181.
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Defendant's proposition-unassailable from Katz's conceptual per-
spective-is peremptorily dismissed. "The language of the Fourth
Amendment itself," the Court trumped, "answers [that]
contention." 25 5
The complementary move, bolstering the psychological per-
spective by reference to the mechanical formula, is accomplished
with equal facility:
the rule of Hester v. United States ... that we reaffirm today, may be
understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately de-
mand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields ....
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance. 256
The magnitude of Oliver's impact on the scope of the constitu-
tional protection of privacy defies overstatement. According to the
Court, most of the land mass of the United States -"the many mil-
lions of acres that are ... not close to any structure"-is no longer
governed by the command of the fourth amendment.257 Moreover,
"it is clear, that the term 'open fields' may include any unoccupied
or undeveloped area outside the curtilage. An open field need be
neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used in common
speech." 258
That government agents acting without a warrant, probable
cause, reasonable suspicion or any predicate whatsoever may enter
and search secluded "unoccupied or undeveloped areas" disregard-
ing fences, signs, custom and criminal trespass laws is a result not
easily reached under a doctrine that purports to protect any "rea-
sonable" or "justifiable" expectation of privacy. Thus, the "open
fields" leg of the majority opinion must provide more than the ap-
pearance of doctrinal legitimacy; it must bear as well much of the
weight of the substantive legitimacy-in-fact of the Oliver result. On
examination the Court's two previous "open fields" decisions are
clearly inadequate to the task. Although the Court had held sixty
years earlier, in a two page opinion in Hester,259 that open fields are
not included within the fourth amendment's protection of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects," that sort of doctrinal literalism cannot
survive Katz' abandonment of the mechanical Olmstead standards and
their replacement by the "legitimate expectation" formula. More
255 Oliver, at 181.
256 Id. at 178.
257 Id. at 182 n.12.
258 Id. at 180 n.ll.
259 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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pointedly, Hester is defective precedent for the Oliver result even if
one disregards the intervening metamorphosis in fourth amend-
ment analysis.
In Hester, revenue officers observed from their hiding place fifty
to one hundred yards away an apparent sale of distilled spirits by
defendant to a customer who drove up to the house. When warning
was given, the defendant took a gallon jug from a nearby car and he
and his customer fled. In the ensuing chase, both containers were
abandoned and broken; however, the officers later testified that the
residue in the jug was "moonshine whiskey." 260 While the officers
remained on the premises, other apparent customers arrived by car
and were turned away. On these facts it is clear that Mr. Hester's
was an "open" open field, enclosed at most by a pasture fence26 1
and open in fact to persons who sought to buy whiskey there. More-
over, the officer's observation may not have been made from Mr.
Hester's field, "it being assumed, on the strength of the pursuing
officer's saying that he supposed they were on Hester's land, that
such was the fact." 262
Furthermore, the Hester Court held that "even if there had been
a trespass, the [officer's] ... testimony was not obtained by an illegal
search or seizure. The defendant's own acts .. .disclosed the jug
... and there was no seizure in the sense of the law when the officers
examined [its] contents ... after it had been abandoned." 263
Lastly, a careful reading of the Hester opinion discloses that it
does not rest on the "open fields" exception at all.264 "The only
shadow of a ground for bringing up the case," the Court said, "is
drawn from the hypothesis that the examination of the vessels took place
upon Hester's father's land." 265 A complete answer to this ground
is that the officers, having observed the commission of the offense,
were entitled to enter defendant's outdoor property to arrest and to
examine abandoned evidence of the offense in plain view on such
property. 266 It is wholly superfluous to add, as the Hester Court did,
that "the... protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment... is
not extended to the open fields." 2 6 7
260 Id. at 58.
261 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 194 n.18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
262 Hester, 265 U.S. at 58.
263 Id. at 58.
264 Saltzburg, supra note 8, at 3.
265 Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
266 See Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970)(dicta); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); cf. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976)(entry of build-
ing permissible where arrestee retreated indoors at sight of officers.).
267 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.
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Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp. ,268 the Court's
first post-Katz application of the open fields doctrine, is equally
flawed support for the Oliver result. In Western Alfalfa a Colorado
Health Department inspector entered a corporation's outdoor
premises to determine whether smoke emitted from its chimneys
was in compliance with air quality standards. Based on the inspec-
tor's observations, the Board issued a cease-and-desist order. On
review, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the inspector's en-
try and observations constituted an unreasonable search under the
fourth amendment and set aside the Board's order. In an opinion
by justice Douglas, the Court unanimously reversed. The inspector,
the Court said, "had sighted what anyone in the city who was near
the plant could see in the sky-plumes of smoke." 269 True, "[t]he
field inspector was on respondent's property [] but we are not ad-
vised that he was on premises from which the public was ex-
cluded .... The invasion of privacy ... if it can be said to exist, is
abstract and theoretical." 270
Perhaps for these reasons, the Court in Oliver neither cited Katz
nor assessed respondent's claim according to the "expectation of
privacy" formula, and, indeed, made only cursory reference to Hes-
ter. "Fairly read," the Oliver dissenters concluded, the Court's
"open fields" precedents affirm only the "unremarkable proposi-
tion" that "an official may, without a warrant, enter private land
from which the public is not excluded and make observations from
that vantage point." 27'
That six justices were willing to extend the open fields exemp-
.tion several magnitudes beyond its previous sphere can only be
viewed as a stunning disregard for the right of individual privacy.
Because state law cannot, after Oliver, bar federal officers from en-
tering, in defiance of state trespass laws, "any unoccupied or unde-
veloped area outside the curtilage, ' '272 even though the officers act
"without a warrant or probable cause," the thirty-four states that
filed amicus briefs urging the result in Air Pollution Variance Board
may one day rue what they have wrought.273
268 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
269 Id. at 865.
270 Id.
271 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 194.
272 Id. at 180 n.ll.
273 The Court's recent decision in United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139
(1987), extends the "open fields" exception by narrowly confining the "curtilage" to
those areas that harbor "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life,' " and by ruling that non-residential buildings located in "open




Thus far this Artcle has sought to extract the nature of the
scope of the fourth amendment from an examination of the Court's
responses to a variety of investigative techniques, ranging from high
tech contraband detectors to entry and inspection of "open fields."
In each case, the Court denied protection on the ground that no
"legitimate" expectation of privacy had been infringed. Always
looming in the background of the Court's decisions have stood the
twin peaks of fourth amendment analysis: the scope-negating doc-
trine of "plain view" and the scope-affirming holding in Katz that
'justifiable" expectations of privacy cannot be defeated by sense en-
hancing devices that make perceptible that which was intended to be
private.
All of these features are reprised in the Court's decisions in the
"aerial surveillance" cases--California v. Ciraolo274 and Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States.275 In Ciraolo, the police had received an anony-
mous tip that the defendant was growing marijuana in the backyard
of his Santa Clara home. Unable to see over defendant's six-foot
perimeter and ten-foot interior fences, police officers observed and
photographed marijuana plants growing in defendant's yard as they
flew over it at an altitude of 1,000 feet. 276 In Dow Chemical Co., the
Environmental Protection Agency employed a commercial aerial
photographer who, using a floor-mounted, precision aerial mapping
camera, photographed Dow's heavily guarded 2,000 acre chemical
manufacturing facility in Midland, Michigan. 277
The aerial surveillance cases illustrate the most obvious redun-
dancy in the doctrine relating to the scope of the fourth amend-
ment: the relationship between the textual term "search" and the
Court-created notion of a "legitimate" or "reasonable" expectation
of privacy. If the latter term is merely definitional, the redundancy
is intended, as in the statement "A 'search' occurs when an expecta-
tion of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is
defendant's 200 acre ranch by crossing a perimeter fence, three interior fences and a
fence that enclosed the front portion of defendant's barn and conducted a flashlight
aided inspection of the interior of the barn while standing under the overhang of the
barn, they effected no "search" within the protection of the fourth amendment.
"[S]tanding as they were in the open fields," the Court held, "the Constitution did not
forbid them to observe the phenylacetone laboratory located in respondent's barn." Id.
at 1141.
274 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
275 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
276 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209.
277 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 229.
1 152 [Vol. 79
FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE
infringed." 278
Ciraolo exemplifies this use of the link between "search" and
"expectation": because Mr. Ciraolo's backyard marijuana plot was
visible from public airspace, the Court "readily conclude[d] that re-
spondent's expectation that his garden was protected from such ob-
servation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is
prepared to honor."279 Reduced to its analytic components the rea-
soning is: "plain view" negates "search;" and a non-"search" in-
fringes no "legitimate" expectation of privacy.
As if to confirm the definitional redundancy of its conclusion,
the Court announced its result in Dow in "search" rather than "ex-
pectation" terminology, although the reasoning is identical in both
cases. In Dow, the Court held that "the taking of aerial photographs
of an industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a
search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment." 280
The premise for both conclusions, however, is the proposition
that the areas observed were within plain view. "Any member of the
public," the Court said in Ciraolo, "flying in this airspace who
glanced down could have seen everything that these officers ob-
served."' 28 ' Similarly, in Dow, the Court reasoned that "[a]ny person
with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate the
photographs taken by the EPA." 28 2
Because the decisions obviously rest on "plain view" reasoning,
it is puzzling that neither the ChiefJustice's opinions for the major-
ity28 3 norJustice Powell's dissenting opinions expressly refer to that
well established doctrine.28 4 Perhaps the reason lies in the label,
not the content, of the doctrine, for while it is technically apt, the
phrase "plain view" hardly describes the extraordinary lengths to
which the government went to observe Ciraolo's and Dow's
property.
In any event, the Court avoids the label by relying on the
broader proposition that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public.., is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection," 28 5 a
278 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)(cited in Karo, 468 U.S. at
712).
279 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213-14.
280 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 239.
281 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214.
282 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 231.
283 "Plain view" is mentioned only in a quote from Justice Harlan's concurring opin-
ion in Katz. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967)(Harlan, J., concurring)).
284 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971).
285 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, 351).
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move that yields a variety of consequences. Its effect on the aerial
surveillance decisions is to pit Katz' holding that justified expecta-
tions of privacy will be protected against its opposing dictum that
knowing exposure defeats protection. The former is championed
by the dissenters, and the latter, as previously noted, by the
majority.
Of more significance to the present investigation, the Court's
reliance upon "knowing exposure" greatly enlarges the degree to
which the redundancy may be explained as definitional: one has no
protected expectation of privacy in that which is "knowingly ex-
posed," and its observation therefore entails no "search." This
analysis can be straightforwardly applied to a variety of evidence
gathering techniques that the Court has ruled beyond the protec-
tion of the amendment. Conversations with undercover agents, 286
and observations made with consent or of things in "plain view" or
in public places, for example, are all circumstances in which it makes
both common and legal sense to say that the information acquired
was "knowingly exposed." More difficult cases arise when the expo-
sure occurs through the use of communications media, such as tele-
phone and mail services, 287 or essential utility,288 financial 289 or
social services, 290 where the choice to forego "exposure" is virtually
foreclosed. 29' In other situations, knowing exposure is accompa-
nied not by an expectation of privacy, but by an expectation of ano-
nymity, 292 as with trash put out for collection 293 or when one is
traveling on the highway.294
The aerial surveillance cases present two additional circum-
stances that call for more than mechanical application of the propo-
sition that the observed activities were "knowingly exposed." The
more difficult issue concerns aerial surveillance as such. Does the
fourth amendment offer any protection against observations from a
technically legal but highly unusual vantage point? Is it significant
that, as the dissent notes, "many people build fences around their
residential areas, but few build roofs over their backyards"? 295 Is it
286 See infra text accompanying notes 291-308.
287 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
288 California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
289 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
290 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
291 Grano, Perplexing Questions About Fourth Amendment Issues, 69J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 425, 440 (1978).
292 LaFave, supra note 144, at 301-302.
293 See California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
294 United States v, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
295 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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sufficient to defeat protection that "[a]ny member of the public fly-
ing in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything
that these officers observed"? 29 6 Or is that possibility irrelevant be-
cause such passengers "normally obtain at most a fleeting, anony-
mous, and nondiscriminating glimpse of the landscape and
buildings over which they pass"? 29 7
It does not seem overly cynical to suggest that these conflicting
views of society's "expectations" function, and are designed to func-
tion, to disguise or avoid the critical value choice: the decision
whether, to paraphrase Justice Harlan, "we should impose on our
citizens the risks of the [airborne] ... observer without at least the
protection of the warrant requirement. ' 298 The Court's pretense
that its judgment is compelled by the "knowing exposure" of every
outdoor activity not shielded from aerial monitoring displays both a
low regard for fourth amendment values and a trivial view of its own
role as keeper of the constitutional balance between government au-
thority and individual privacy.
The other circumstance, present in Dow and skirted in Ciraolo,
concerns the use of photographic equipment to enhance the gov-
ernment's airborne observation. The majority in Dow concedes that:
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveil-
lance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite
technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant...
[however,] [t]he mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at
least to the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional
problems. 299
It is strange that this discussion, seemingly in response to Katz'
holding that phenomena made perceptible only by the use of sense
enhancing technology are not thereby rendered "knowingly ex-
posed," makes no reference to the Katz decision. The limits on
sense enhancement devices are acknowledged, but the rationale for
those limits-to safeguard justifiable expectations of privacy-is ig-
nored. Even more ominous is the Court's tacit invocation of the
Olmstead-Goldman standard that Katz replaced: "[a]n electronic de-
vice to penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confiden-
tial discussions... would raise very different and far more serious
questions . .. ."300
296 Id. at 213-14 (emphasis added).
297 Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting).
298 White, 401 U.S. at 786, (Harlan, J., dissenting).
299 Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 238.
900 Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
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E. PRIVACY, ANONYMITY, SECRECY AND "CONSENT"
The Court's decisions defining the scope of the fourth amend-
ment are far more significant than its rulings about the content of
the protection or remedies for its violation. In part this is because a
decision denying fourth amendment application forecloses consid-
eration of the latter features. Of much greater importance, how-
ever, is the fact that such a decision frees every governmental
agency, not just the police, from any judicial oversight of the
agency's decision to engage in the exempted practice. Moreover,
the federal structure exempts federal officers and agencies from
state laws restricting such conduct by state officers. 30'
It does not follow, of course, that the Court ought to find any
particular practice within the governance of the fourth amendment.
However, the importance of the issue, together with the malleability
of the Katz standard, suggest that the Court's decisions since Katz
would tend to fall on either side of the line with roughly equal fre-
quency. What accounts, therefore, for the fact that all but one30 2 of
the Court's twenty-one major "search" decisions have ruled the
challenged practice beyond the province of the fourth amendment?
At the root of such results must lie a majority that consistently pre-
fers collective over individual values at the constitutional margin, a
circumstance the doctrine is powerless to prevent. Because each de-
cision demands doctrinal congruence with the value choice it imple-
ments, the resulting constitutional doctrine of necessity tends
increasingly to reflect, accommodate and compel such results.
As suggested earlier, the retransformation of the fourth amend-
ment since Mapp has rendered it increasingly inhospitable to the
value of privacy. Remedies for admitted violations have been
sharply curtailed, while the content of the amendment now provides
a tailored solution to nearly every law enforcement demand for
greater investigative autonomy. Nowhere, however, has the right of
privacy been so consistently subordinated as in the Court's deci-
sions governing the scope of the amendment.
In a few of the post-Katz cases, the Court denied fourth amend-
ment protection finding that no "search or seizure," in the ordinary
meaning of those words, had occurred. Some of these decisions in-
volve perfectly straightforward applications of the text of the
amendment. In Maryland v. Macon,30 3 for example, the purchase by
an undercover agent of an allegedly obscene magazine offered for
301 U. S. CONST. art. VI.
302 Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
303 472 U.S. 463, 467 (1985).
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sale to the public in the defendant's bookstore was not a "seizure."
Similarly, the entry into premises open to the public to serve a sub-
poena is not a fourth amendment "event" for which a predicate is
required.30 4 The same was true in Wyman v.james,305 in which the
Court-held that a welfare caseworker's "home visitation" that "in
itself is not forced or compelled" was not a "search." As this case
suggests, the determination whether a given governmental action
constitutes a "search" or a "seizure" is seldom a purely textual in-
quiry, because every observation is not a search nor every acquisi-
tion a seizure. Thus, the controversy, before and after Katz, has
centered on whether an admitted entry, observation or acquisition
amounts in law to a search or seizure. Because nearly all of the
Court's recent decisions have ruled against fourth amendment cov-
erage, it is appropriate to attempt to classify the circumstances that
defeat application of the amendment to government conduct that
qualifies, linguistically, as a search, seizure or entry.
Many, perhaps most, of these circumstances derive from some
variation on the idea of "consent." In its most elementary form,
consent denotes an intentional relinquishment of the protection of
the amendment. Consent in this explicit sense has several familiar
features. Because it effects a "waiver" of the protection against
searches and seizures, its use is subject to formal restrictions: the
consenting party must have actual authority to waive the protec-
tion3°6 and consent must be "voluntary." 30 7 When consent is used
as a formal waiver of fourth amendment rights, it is commonly
viewed as a freestanding doctrinal instrument rather than, as here,
the genus that comprehends a variety of scope-negating devices.
Closely related to consent as waiver is the notion, already en-
countered, that one has no protected expectation of privacy in that
which has been "knowingly exposed to the public."308 Here, con-
sent is implied rather than formal; attributed rather than discovered;
tacit rather than explicit. When consent moves from formal to cir-
cumstantial it yields a variety of important doctrinal and practical
effects. It is precisely this shift that transforms the analysis from
"consent" to "expectation of privacy." Moreover, freed from what
the "consenting" party formally intended, implied consent may be
defined according to broad categories of circumstances deemed to
defeat such an expectation. Every fact, thing or activity shared with
304 Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 413 (1984).
305 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
306 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
307 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968).
308 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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another and not legally privileged is vulnerable. The doctrinal rec-
ord since Katz presents an unbroken line of rejected exceptions.
The fact that information was intended to be confidential or in
reliance upon the friendship or complicity of another does not de-
feat the imputation of implied consent, as the Court has consistently
ruled.30 9 The doctrine is expectably rigid, for to bar the undercover
informant's revelation would in effect create an intolerably broad
privilege for all confidential communications. Because one is
deemed to know that unprivileged communications may be freely
revealed or compelled by subpoena, the secret shared with another
is perforce "knowingly exposed to the public." 310 Accordingly, the
controversy has centered on the use of electronic aids to preserve or
facilitate the acquisition of such shared information.
It is revealing that the doctrine exempting the wired-for-sound
informant is commonly labelled "one party consent." The label re-
fers to the informant's consent as waiver; the speaker's "consent" is
tacit and therefore operates to defease not the fourth amendment
but the expectation of privacy on which, since Katz, its application
depends.
Just as a confidential disclosure erects no legal barrier to its ac-
quisition from the auditor, a confidential bailment of goods
amounts to a "knowing exposure" of those goods and defeats the
bailor's expectation of privacy in them.3 1 The same result follows
even when the bailee, for example a bank officer or accountant, 312
would commonly be expected to treat the material as confidential,
and applies as well even to privileged relationships.31 3 It is clear
from these examples that exposure need not be to the "public" in
the sense of knowledge available to all or most people. On the con-
trary, "public" as used by the Court seems to include any informa-
tion not kept entirely secret.
Closely akin to material exposed with an expectation of confi-
dentiality are cases in which the ordinary expectation is either that
the material will not be observed or, if it is, that it will not be con-
nected with any particular person. The most obvious examples are
trash put out for collection3 14 and sewage. The expectation that at-
309 See infra notes 364-88 and accompanying text.
310 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
311 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); see California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct.
1625 (1988).
312 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
313 Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976).




tends one's contributions to these waste streams is not secrecy but
anonymity. A similar attitude accompanies our use of the postal315
and telephone3 16 systems: the names and addresses of correspon-
dents and the numbers of those called are of necessity disclosed to
the system's employees, but there exists an expectation that this in-
formation will be treated as part of an undifferentiated flow. This
sense of anonymity extends to observations from public airspace:
activities on the ground are not invisible, but individuals expect that
they are undifferentiable. That one might feel less invaded by gov-
ernment monitoring of his or her use of water, electricity and other
essential services does not imply that one expects focussed attention
on consumption records; it reflects knowledge that such records,
unlike mail covers and pen registers, are routinely kept and, of
greater significance, do not disclose intimate or personal behavior
or relationships.
To subsume any or all of these expectations of confidentiality
(even in matters not "privileged") and anonymity (even in matters
not secret) would entail no stretch of the idea of "privacy" in its
ordinary meaning. Further, to subsume any such expectation within
the fourth amendment's protection against unregulated searches
and seizures would entail, since Katz, only the judgment that reli-
ance upon it was "justifiable." As noted, however, it is precisely this
judgment that a majority of the Court has consistently rejected, not
because the claim of privacy in one's "private affairs" is implausible,
but rather, the Court's decisions imply, because any information not
legally privileged or kept entirely secret is simply not eligible for
protection since it is no longer "private." Several of the Court's
recent decisions involving even more limited exposure than the pre-
ceding examples vividly display the same attitude: any exposure
defeats protection.
F. BETWEEN SCOPE AND CONTENT
Up to this point this Article has considered only circumstances
in which the "exposure" and the observation were simultaneous:
while the activity or information was exposed, the government or its
informant observed it. Three of the Court's recent decisions go fur-
ther, denying protection to activity exposed but not observed and to
material once exposed but thereafter withdrawn from "public" view
prior to any government observation. The standard rule, of course,
is that such exposure does not extinguish an otherwise valid expec-
315 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 500-03.
316 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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tation of privacy in the material or activity.3171n United States v.
Knotts,318 government agents sought to follow the car of a suspected
illegal drug manufacturer after he purchased a container of chloro-
form in which the seller had allowed an electronic tracking beacon
to be placed. When both visual and electronic surveillance were lost
by the agents, a helicopter equipped with a monitoring device took
up the search. "[A]bout one hour later" the helicopter search lo-
cated the signal, now stationary, at a remote cabin near Shell Lake,
Wisconsin. 319 Had the agents maintained visual surveillance on the
highway and in the "open fields" outside the cabin, they could have
seen what the suspect had "knowingly exposed"-his route and des-
tination-by means not subject to fourth amendment control.320
On the other hand, as the Court held in Karo sixteen months later,
the monitoring of a "beeper" inside a private residence constitutes a
"search" for fourth amendment purposes.3 2'
It is striking that the Court's decision in Knotts, which drew no
dissent, resolved the "scope" issue by reference not to what in fact
occurred-monitoring that located the device inside a private resi-
dence-but to what did not occur-observation (electronic or other-
wise) of the suspect's vehicle en route to the cabin. More striking
still, what did not occur was deemed permissible by reference to
what could have occurred:
Visual surveillance from public places along ... [the suspect's] route
or adjoining Knott's premises would have sufficed to reveal all of these
facts to the police. . . . A police car following ... [the suspect] at a
distance throughout his journey could have observed him leaving the
public highway and arriving at the cabin.., with the drum of chloro-
form still in the car.322
The Court concluded that because the use of the electronic
tracking beacon "raises no constitutional issues which visual surveil-
lance would not also raise.. . monitoring the beeper signals... [did
not] invade any legitimate expectation of privacy ... "323 In short,
knowing "exposure" of one's whereabouts by use of the public
highways, even though unobserved, defeats the expectation that
one's location will not be discovered by otherwise constitutionally
objectionable surveillance.
317 See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 776-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
318 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
319 Id. at 278.
320 Id. at 282.
321 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
322 Id. at 282.
323 Id. at 285.
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In Illinois v. Andreas,3 24 customs inspectors found marijuana con-
cealed in a compartment of a table shipped from Calcutta. After
tests confirmed the nature of the contraband, the table was repack-
aged and delivered to the defendant, the addressee. While an of-
ficer sought to obtain a search warrant, another maintained
surveillance of defendant's apartment. About forty minutes later,
before the warrant could be obtained, the defendant emerged from
the apartment with the container. Defendant was immediately ar-
rested and the container was seized and taken to the police station
where it was "reopened" without a warrant and found to contain the
marijuana previously observed. 325 Whether the "reopening" con-
stituted a "search" was crucial to admissibility of the contraband,3 26
because the warrantless "search" of such a container is unambigu-
ously barred by the Chadwick-Sanders doctrine.
Justice Brennan's dissent declared that the Court had "never
held that the physical opening and examination of a container in the
possession of an individual was anything other than a search. 327
The Chief Justice reasoned for the majority, however, that:
once a container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit drugs,
the contraband becomes like objects physically within the plain view of
the police, and the claim to privacy is lost. Consequently, the subse-
quent reopening of the container is not a 'search' within the intend-
ment of the Fourth Amendment.3 28
A similar result was reached a year later in United States v. Jacob-
sen,329 in which Justice Stevens employed nearly identical reasoning
to permit "visual inspection" of the contents of a damaged package
that a private carrier had already examined and repackaged. Citing
Andreas, Justice Stevens reasoned that "the precise character of the
white powder's visibility to the naked eye is far less significant than
the fact ...that it was virtually certain that it [the package] con-
tained nothing but contraband."3 3 0 Therefore, the Court con-
cluded, the "inspection". "infringed no legitimate expectation of
privacy and hence was not a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ' '331
Analytically, Andreas and Jacobsen provide a rare glimpse of the
boundary between the content of the fourth amendment and its
324 463 U.S. 765 (1983).
325 Id. at 767-78.
326 Id. at 770.
327 Id. at 774.
328 Id. at 771-72.
329 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
330 Id. at 120 n.17.
331 Id. at 120.
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scope. The content rules provide that probable cause to believe
that a container in official custody holds seizable matter is not itself
a sufficient basis to search it. Although the container may be seized,
it may not be searched without a warrant. 332 If the probability that
the container holds seizable material rises to "virtual certainty,"
however, the right of privacy in the contents of the container is
"lost" 333 or not "infringed.- 334 Thus, opening the container and
examining its contents is not a "search," and, it follows, no "predi-
cate" is required.
Andreas and Jacobsen occupy one end of a "probability" spectrum
that bridges scope and content. At the other end, decisions such as
United States v. Place335 permit the temporary seizure and non-intru-
sive inspection of containers "reasonably suspected" of harboring
contraband. A higher probability--"probable cause"-permits
seizure but not search of opaque containers. The highest
probability-certainty or virtual certainty-escapes the strictures of
the predicate rules entirely by taking the intrusion outside the scope
of the fourth amendment. Certainty is tantamount to plain view,
and, as previously noted, plain view is simply a predecessor term for
"knowing exposure," which in turn implies "consent," and consent
defeats the expectation of privacy essential to a "search."
Because they deny that a "search" had occurred, Andreas and
Jacobsen appear to be decisions about the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. Appearances, however, can be deceiving in this analytic bor-
derland, for with a minor shift in perspective Andreas and Jacobsen
appear equally convincingly to be decisions about the content of the
amendment. In United States v. Chadwick336 the Court rejected the
"extreme view" that the "Warrant Clause protects only interests tra-
ditionally identified with the home," and held unreasonable the war-
rantless search of a foot locker that officers had lawfully seized and
"reduced ... to their exclusive control." 337
Declining the government's invitation to equate all portable
containers with automobiles, the Court instead launched a new body
of doctrine relating to container searches that for a time provided
greater, not less, protection for containers encountered during ar-
rests or auto searches. 338 Since 1981, however, the Court's decisions
332 See cases cited supra note 223.
333 Andreas, 463 U.S. at 772.
334 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984).
335 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983).
336 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
337 Id. at 6, 17.




have consistently subordinated the protection for containers when it
conflicted with the authority to search without a warrant incident to
arrest or incarceration,3 39 or during the search of a vehicle at the
scene340 or following its impoundment.34 1 In this company, Andreas
and Jacobsen simply add another exception to Chadwick: no warrant
is required to search a container that the seizing officer is "virtually
certain" contains contraband. Although the requirement of "virtual
certainty" technically operates to extinguish the possessor's expec-
tation of privacy in the container, in form -and function that require-
ment is indistinguishable from the role of the predicate requirement
in legitimating instrusions within the scope of the fourth
amendment.
That Andreas and Jacobsen seem more to resemble content than
scope decisions reveals an important shift in the rationale for deny-
ing fourth amendment protection. Whereas the preceding cases
could all be grouped, more or less comfortably, within the idea of
implied consent based on "knowing exposure," the emphasis in An-
dreas and Jacobsen is on the "legitimacy," not the fact, of the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy. In these cases, the individual has not,
by exposing a secret, relinquished the protection; rather he or she
has become disentitled to privacy by virtue of the government's su-
perior claim to the observation. The most extreme example of the
shift from consent to disentitlement is Jacobsen's other holding: that
one has no legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband, even if
one has never exposed it, and thus no right to protection against a
device that detects only the presence of contraband.
G. CONSENT, DISENTITLEMENT AND EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
From this perspective, it is possible to discern a continuum that
runs from actual consent at one pole, through the varieties of im-
plied consent, and finally, as the bases for implying consent become
increasingly fictive, to legal disentitlement at the other. Abandoned
property clearly falls near the consent pole, because it is a knowing
relinquishment of privacy not only to the government but also to
the world.3 42 Incarceration clearly falls near the disentitlement
pole. In Hudson v. Palmer, the Court held that "society is not pre-
pared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of pri-
339 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
340 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
341 United States v.Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
342 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 463-75.
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vacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell."3 43
Justice O'Connor's emphatic concurrence confirms both that
the rationale is disentitlement and, in concluding that therefore cell
searches are "reasonable," the resemblance between disentitling the
defendant, a scope issue, and entitling the government to search or
seize, the content issue.3 44 "The fact of arrest and incarceration
abates all privacy and possessory interest in personal effects... and
therefore all searches and seizures of the contents of an inmate's cell
are reasonable."3 45 As with the container cases, the defeasement of
the right of privacy upon incarceration finds close kin among the
content decisions that permit searches and seizures of arrested and
incarcerated persons.3 46
Thus, the "expectation of privacy" rubric comprehends two
quite different notions: (1) "consent" in its various forms, derived
from the interplay between the individual's conduct and the rules
governing privilege and publicity; and (2) "disentitlement," derived
from the strength of the government's authority over the place,
thing or person observed or inspected. Although establishing the
authority to disentitle is very similar to establishing the predicate
that makes a search or seizure "reasonable," its function is to deny
that a "search or seizure," within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment, has even occurred.
Legal doctrine tends to cluster around value antinomies that
are natural features of organized society. The doctrines relating to
the criminal process, whether derived from constitution, statute or
rule, are designed to regulate one of the most important of these-
the ongoing competition between individual freedom and autonomy
and its natural opponent collective security and crime control. The
central norm in this scheme is the fourth amendment's prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Because legal doctrine can never "resolve" the tension that
generated it, a successful doctrinal component must always straddle
the value antinomy in a way that recognizes the validity of each op-
posing pole. It would not do to ban all searches and seizures, nor to
allow even unreasonable ones. Perhaps the most elegant and suc-
cinct example of a successful doctrinal device was the pre-incorpora-
343 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
344 Id. at 537 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
345 Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
346 Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Robinson, 414




tion standard for a violation of due process, which judged state
action according to its congruence with a scheme of "ordered
liberty."34 7
Although the two clauses of the fourth amendment provide a
suitably ambivalent doctrinal rubric for evaluating conflicts over the
content of the prohibition, the scope of the protection-limited to
"searches and seizures "-requires further doctrinal elaboration.
Such elaborated doctrine must not only bridge the opposing value
conflict, to be useful it must also be comprised of roughly equal
parts of definitional and judgmental elements. The fourth amend-
ment accomplishes this task by linking a judgmental content rule
("unreasonable") to definitional scope terms ("searches" and
"seizures"). When the political pressure generated by the exclu-
sionary remedy focused attention on the scope of the protection,
however, a more sophisticated doctrinal instrument inevitably de-
veloped: one that would accommodate both judgment and defini-
tion while recognizing the legitimacy of both crime control and
individual privacy.
The Olmstead-Goldman solution seemed to emphasize definition
with its references to physical "penetration" and tangible "things,"
but it left room for judgment in the question-begging phrase "con-
stitutionally protected area."3 48 The Katz standard, in contrast,
seemed to be all judgment with its references to a "reasonable" or
"justifiable" "expectation of privacy." The definitional gap was fil-
led, however, by the textual references to "searches and seizures,"
since the text can only be supplemented, not supplanted. Katz'
scope formula spanned the value antinomy by promising to protect
an "expectation of privacy" that is "justifiable" or "legitimate."
Ironically, the most troubling element in the Katz formulation,
the idea of an "expectation" of privacy, is not to be found injustice
Stewart's majority opinion; it is the invention of Justice Harlan ex-
pressing his "understanding of the rule that has emerged [not from
the majority opinion but] from prior decisions." 3 49 Justice Stewart
spoke only of "the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably relied while
using the telephone booth," the invasion of which "thus constituted
a search and seizure'...,,350
Unfortunately, Justice Harlan's formulation has long since be-
come the orthodox version of the Katz rule, perpetuating the mis-
leading implications of the idea of an "expectation" of privacy. Its
347 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1935).
348 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
349 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (Harlan, J., concurring).
350 Id. at 353. See Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 384.
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defects are several. In the first place, as Professor Amsterdam
noted,35 ' a person's subjective belief can neither confer nor defease
fourth amendment protection. The paranoid and the Pollyanna are
entitled to the protection the amendment secures to them, no less
and no more. Moreover, even if "expectation" is viewed in a more
general sense as comprehending a societal sense of privacy, serious
problems remain. What is the nature of the relevant "expecta-
tion"-that the information or material shall remain a secret from
the world, or only from government? Further, since the govern-
ment is entitled to invade privacy, to search and seize, when its com-
pliance with the content rules makes such an invasion "reasonable,"
the material "expectation" must consist of the belief, individual or
societal, that a particular intrusion is subject to fourth amendment
constraints, because that is all that "privacy" entails. However, an
"expectation" about the scope of the amendment that is different
from the protection it actually confers cannot expand or diminish
the application of the amendment. Thus, "expectations" are only
relevant when they are identical to the technical judgments about
the scope of the protection, which is equivalent to saying that "ex-
pectations" are not relevant at all. Expectations of privacy derive
from the rules governing the scope and content of the fourth
amendment, not, as Harlan's formula would suggest, vice versa.
H. BEYOND DOCTRINE
The scope of the fourth amendment is thus the inescapable re-
sponsibility of the justices and will necessarily reflect both their atti-
tudes about the value antinomy over which it presides and their
sense of the relationship between the fourth amendment and other
bodies of legal doctrine-relating to, for example, ownership, the
power to exclude, consent, "public" property, privilege, and the
like-that imply or affect privacy.
Each of the Justices brings to the resolution of fourth amend-
ment controversies a set of attitudes and beliefs concerning the fun-
damental tension that underlies such disputes: the clash between
individual privacy and collective security. The doctrine will reflect
both the dominant view of the Court and the strength with which
that view is held or rejected by individual Justices.
A few simple measures reveal the attitude of the present Court.
Of 125 fourth amendment decisions from the beginning of the 1971
term through the end of the 1986 term, twenty were decided by a
351 Amsterdam, supra note 8, at 384.
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unanimous Court.3 52 Given the polarized views of the Justices, it
seems safe to conclude that these decisions raised no issue at the
doctrinal-political margin. It is significant, however, that 16% of the
privacy cases that reach the tip of the judicial pyramid can be re-
solved according to principles on which the Justices unanimously
agree. The results, moreover, are not one-sided: ten such cases
sided with collective security 53 while ten held in favor of individual
privacy.3 54
The cases that divided the Court, on the other hand, reveal a
strong bias toward collective security. Nearly 80% (seventy-eight
cases) of the ninety-eight non-unanimous fourth amendment deci-
sions found in favor of law enforcement over individual privacy at
the disputed margin.
A slightly less crude measure of the Justices' predispositions to-
ward the relative dominance of collective and individual values can
be generated by positing a bias for each Justice and measuring the
frequency with which he or she votes against the predicted bias. A
completely unbiased Justice would presumably vote as often against
as for any posited preference. Table 1 shows the results of these
calculations for each of the twelve Justices on the Court during the
period.
These rough data expose the attitudes that fuel the doctrinal
engine: a majority of the Justices prefer, at the margin, collective
352 Including cases in which some Justices concurred to emphasize variant but com-
patible views.
353 United States v. Hensley, 105 S. Ct. 675 (1985) (Brennan,J. concurred); Donovan
v. Lone Steer, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 769 (1984); Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 US. 640 (1983)
(Marshall, J. concurred in the judgment); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens concurred in the judgment); United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per
curiam); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980) (Justices Powell and Blackmun
concurred; ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist concurred in the re-
suit; Justice Marshall did not participate); Air Pollution Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.,
416 U.S. 861 (1974); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Shadwick v. Tampa,
407 U.S. 345 (1972).
354 Hayes v. Florida, 105 S. Ct. 1643 (1985) (justices Brennan, Marshall and Black-
mun concurred in thejudgment;Justice Powell did not participate); Winston v. Lee, 105
S. Ct. 1611 (1985) (Burger, CJ. concurred and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist con-
curred in the judgment); Thompson v. Louisiana, 105 S. Ct. 409 (1984) (per curiam);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun
concurred in the result); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442
U.S. 465 (1979) (justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Blackmun concurred in the
judgment); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); Connaly v. Georgia, 429
U.S. 244 (1977) (per curiam); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975) (justice Rehn-
quist concurred; ChiefJustice Burger and Justices White and Blackmun concurred in
the udgment); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (Justices Stewart, Douglas, Bren-





DECISIONS DURING 1971-1986 TERMS
PREDICTED VOTES AGAINST
JUSTICES BIAS PREDICTED BIAS
Rehnquist Collective 0/97 0
Security
O'Connor " 3/43 7
Burger " 7/90 8
Scalia " 1/8 13
Powell " 18/96 19
Blackmun " 19/97 20
White " 24/98 25
Stewart " 24/55 44
Stevens Individual 32/80 40
Privacy
Marshall " 4/97 4
Brennan " 2/95 2
Douglas " 0/15 0
security over individual privacy in 75-80% of the disputed cases,
without regard to any of the details of the controversy. The ana-
lyst's task is to examine the role of the doctrine in directing and
limiting the effect of those attitudes.
As suggested above, to understand how the scope of the fourth
amendment is determined, it is useful to isolate two alternative ap-
proaches. On the one hand, the right of privacy (or its absence) may
be viewed as simply the product of other bodies of doctrine relating
to property rights, powers of consent, privileged communications,
and similar rules that provide the legal matrix for privacy. Accord-
ing to this rule-dominated approach, a "search" or "seizure" con-
sists only of the infringement of an otherwise legally protected right
or privilege. The converse is also true: government action that
does not invade such a right or privilege.falls outside the protection
of the fourth amendment.
The alternative, concept-based, approach views privacy more
abstractly. The legal matrix influences the scope of the protection,
but neither wholly defines nor limits it. Under this approach, the
idea of privacy rests on its own foundation and generates its own
sphere of entitlement and disentitlement. In rough outline, the
Olmstead-Goldman doctrine limiting the fourth amendment to physi-
cal trespass on a constitutionally protected area exemplifies the rule-
dominated approach, whereas the Katz formula illustrates the con-
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cept-based approach. Of greater significance is the fact that the
concept-based approach does not supplant the rule-dominated ap-
proach; it absorbs it. The existence of a legally protected right may,
under Katz, yield a protected "expectation of privacy," and its ab-
sence may negate such an expectation. The concept-based ap-
proach also embraces the opposite results: government action that
infringes no otherwise protected legal right may nonetheless violate
an expectation of privacy protected by the fourth amendment, and
conduct that violates a legally protected right or privilege may not
infringe such an expectation.
The Katz formula is commonly perceived to be a doctrine that
favors individual privacy. After all, it unseated Olmstead, enabled the
fourth amendment to keep pace with "[t]he progress of science in
furnishing the Government with means of espionage,"3 55 and drew
the affirmative votes of liberal Justices Douglas, Brennan and For-
tas. Moreover, the Katz standard seems designed to enhance, rather
than restrict, the scope of the amendment; it appears receptive to
every "expectation" of privacy, provided only that it be a "reason-
able" one.
In truth, however, the majority has fashioned Katz' "expecta-
tion" test into its primary instrument for withholding or diminishing
the embrace of the amendment. At its most blunt, the Court, using
the Katz formula, simply refused to deem "reasonable" the expecta-
tion that the government will not probe one's possessions with a
contraband-only sensing device.3 56 As we have seen, Katz also pro-
vides the doctrinal basis for denying protection to any materials or
information "knowingly exposed."3 57 At its most subtle, the Court
has used the Katz standard, applied according to the "standing"
rules announced in Rakas and Rawlings, to disentitle persons whose
claim to protection rests on an otherwise legally protected right or
privilege.358
A solution to the riddle of the redundant limits on the scope of
the fourth amendment now seems near at hand. Each of the inter-
pretations suggested earlier appears to play some part in "the expla-
nation. The doctrinal categories of "search" and "seizure,"
"expectation of privacy" and the "reasonableness" or "legitimacy"
of such expectations express three distinct limits on fourth amend-
355 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
356 United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
357 See supra text accompanying notes 308-316.
358 United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227 (1986); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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ment protection, which the Article terms, respectively, the defini-
tional aspect, varieties of consent, and disentitlement.
By definition, a "consensual encounter" with a law enforcement
officer does not amount to a "seizure" of the person encoun-
tered.359 Similarly, a voluntary transfer3 60 or sale3 6' to a police of-
ficer of incriminating material falls outside the ordinary as well as
the doctrinal definition of "seizure." In the same way, the term
"search" operates to exclude a variety of observations or other ac-
quisitions of information from the scope of the amendment, preemi-
nently those phenomena within the "plain perception" of a legally
situated officer's senses.
In one sense, all of the decisions delimiting the scope of the
fourth amendment are "definitional," because all must ultimately be
related to the text, and the Amendment speaks only of "searches
and seizures" of "persons, houses, papers and effects." 362 By ignor-
ing the confusion generated by the Court's natural tendency to
present its judgments as ineluctably drawn from the text, however, it
is possible to bring into focus other doctrinal and political influ-
ences on the scope of the protection against unreasonable govern-
ment conduct.
Notions of consent and implied consent seem to underlie many
of the Court's decisions denying the existence of an "expectation of
privacy" protected by the amendment. 363 These range from actual,
informed and voluntary consent, at one extreme, to conduct that is
so public that no actual expectation of privacy is imaginable, to care-
fully limited exposures of private information deemed in law not to
support a "reasonable" expectation of privacy, to, at the other ex-
treme, categorical forfeitures of any "legitimate" expectation of pri-
vacy in certain information or under certain circumstances. It is at
this latter extreme, at least, that it becomes more descriptive to term
the limitation a "disentitlement," because there is no feasible course
of action by which the individual's claim to privacy can be preserved.
I. KATZ REVISITED: THE PARTICIPANT MONITOR
This Article has already explored some of the cases that fall in
the middle of the spectrum, noting that protection is denied to in-
formation exposed in confidence, with an expectation of anonymity,
359 Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980); I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U. S. 210 (1984);
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
360 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
361 Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985).
362 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
363 See supra text accompanying notes 306-316.
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or to procure essential financial or municipal services.3 64 This result
is deemed to follow from the Court's consistent line of decisions,
beginning with On Lee v. United States,3 6 5 withholding fourth amend-
ment protection from information "revealed to a third party."3 6 6
Because to hold .otherwise would create, in effect, an impossibly
broad constitutional privilege for "confidential" communications
and jeopardize all undercover police activities, noJustice 6 7 has sug-
gested that the fourth amendment bars the government from pro-
viding, enlisting or even "planting" such a "confidant" in an
otherwise protected place. In United States v. White,3 68 this principle
was tested and reaffirmed in light of Katz' reconceptualization of the
amendment as a device to protect the "privacy" of "persons not
places."
The, question posed by White had bedeviled the Court for
twenty years: whether the fourth amendment governed the surrep-
titious recording or transmission of a suspect's statements to an un-
dercover agent. Prior to Katz, defendants sought to characterize
such statements as the product of a "trespass," arguing that consent
to enter their business or residential premises was vitiated by the
agent's fraudulent misrepresentation of his or her status or purpose.
Such a theory does not depend upon the agent's use of any elec-
tronic apparatus; its effect, therefore, would be to restrict under-
cover activity to public places. The Court has consistently rejected
this trespass theory.3 69
The White case involved a typical narcotics investigation. A
"government informant" equipped with a hidden radio transmitter
engaged the defendant in conversations in a variety of locations, in-
cluding the latter's home, automobile and place of business. Testi-
mony by government agents who overheard those conversations
was admitted at defendant's trial on narcotics charges and he was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment.3 7 0 A
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on
the strength of Katz and, on rehearing en banc, a six to three major-
364 See supra text accompanying notes 285-294.
365 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
366 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
367 With the possible exception ofJustice Douglas, whose dissent in Osbbrn v. United
States, 396 U.S. 1015 (1970), urged that "[e]ntering another's home in disguise to ob-
tain evidence is a 'search' that should bring into play all the protective features of the
fourth amendment."
368 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
369 See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
370 White, 401 U.S. at 746-47.
1989] 1171
JOHN M. JUNKER
ity adhered to that decision.371 A five to four majority of the
Supreme Court reversed. What was at stake in White was nothing
less than the soul of Katz. Had the Katz decision broken the hold of
the rule-dominated conception of the scope of the Amendment?
Was Katz to usher in an era in which the effect of government ac-
tions on the individual's "right of privacy," as such, became the
measure of the Constitution's protection? If so, how far would such
protection extend? To all conversations intended to be "private,"
or only to those "intercepted" by electronic means or transmitted to
third party auditors?
Judge Swygert's opinion for the Court of Appeals' majority
leaned in the direction of a broad protection for any conversation
the individual "justifiably expected .. .to be private," without re-
gard to "the trespass doctrine... which ... was squarely discarded
by the Court in Katz." 372 That some of the conversations occurred
in the informant's residence is irrelevant to this view of the sweep of
Katz. What matters is that the defendant's expectation of conversa-
tional privacy was confirmed both by "the well-laid plans of the
Government agents . . . [which] recognized that the defendant
sought to exclude their uninvited ears," and "the locations chosen
for the private conversations indicat[ing] that the defendant took
reasonable steps to protect against government intrusion." 373
However, faced with the need to reconcile its reasoning with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Hoffa v. United States,3 74 Rathbun v.
United States3 75 and Lopez v. United States,3 76 the Seventh Circuit's
grand structure swiftly collapsed. Hoffa took the reasonably foresee-
able "risk that his intended listener [might] ... subsequently testify
as to the contents of the conversation ... and thus [his] objection
thereto is waived."3 77 "[O]ne who places a telephone call takes the
risk that an extension on the other end of the line may be picked up
by an uninvited third party with or without the complicity of the
intended listener." 378 "Lopez goes no further than to hold that... a
recording of ... conversation [with an informant] ... is admissible
for the limited purpose of corroboration. '" 379
What remains in the realm of protected privacy following this
371 United States v. White, 405 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1969).
372 Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
373 Id. at 846.
374 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
375 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
376 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
377 White, 405 F.2d at 845.
378 Id.
379 Id. at 847.
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set of accommodations is an apparently puny holding: that elec-
tronic transmission, but not taping, of "private conversations," even
with the consent of the transmitting party, is subject to constitu-
tional regulation under the fourth amendment.38 0 This remnant is
sufficient, however, to demonstrate that the reach of the fourth
amendment is not simply the by-product of other bodies of legal
doctrine relating to property rights, privilege and the competency of
witnesses. Given such a right of privacy, freed from the doctrine
that affects privacy but does not necessarily define it, the Court
might deem "legitimate" the expectation against aerial surveillance
of one's home and curtilage or against trespass on one's remote
open fields. It might find "protectible" one's expectation of confi-
dentiality or at least anonymity in financial and utility records. It
would not, in short, assume that anything "revealed . . . to an-
other"38' was therefore outside the realm of the fourth amendment.
For the Supreme Court plurality in White, however, Katz
changed nothing. If "the activities and reports of the [undercover]
police agent himself" are permissible, "it is thus untenable to...
view the same agent with a recorder or transmitter as conducting an
... unconstitutional search and seizure."38 2 Accordingly, the plu-
rality saw "no indication in Katz that the Court meant to ... disturb
the result reached in the On Lee case, nor are we now inclined to
overturn this view of the Fourth Amendment. '" 38 3
Justice Harlan's dissent rejected the plurality's argument that
"it is irrelevant whether secrets are revealed by the mere tattletale
or the transistor.. .,384 Whether the unprotected risk of the former
should entail the latter risk as well could only be decided by ad-
dressing "[t]he critical question . . .whether under our system of
government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on
our citizens the risk of the electronic listener or observer without at
least the protection of a warrant requirement. "3 8 5 That question,
for Harlan, called for an assessment of the impact of electronic mon-
itoring "on the individual's sense of security balanced against the
utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement. '" 3 8 6 "I am
now persuaded that such an approach misconceives the basic issue,
focusing, as it does, on the interests of a particular individual rather
380 Id. at 847-48.
381 E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
382 United State v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971).
383 Id. at 750.
384 Id. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting).




than evaluating the impact of a practice on the sense of security that
is the true concern of the Fourth Amendment's protection of
privacy." 38 7
Unregulated electronic monitoring, he concluded, would:
undermine that confidence and sense of security in dealing with one
another that is characteristic of individual relationships between citi-
zens in a free society . . . [I]t might well smother that spontaneity-
reflected in frivolous, impetuous, sacrilegious and defiant discourse-
that liberates daily life.... All these values are sacrificed by a rule of
law that permits official monitoring of private discourse limited only
by the need to locate a willing assistant. 388
These views did not prevail and have not since attracted a ma-
jority of the justices to a conception of the fourth amendment that
"transcend[s] the search for subjective expectations or legal attribu-
tion of assumptions of risk." 38 9 Instead, constitutionally protected
privacy is conceived to be wholly the product of the interplay of sub-
sidiary doctrine governing property and privilege relationships. In-
deed, as the "open fields" exclusion and the "standing" cases, next
to be examined, demonstrate, a property right may be a necessary
but not a sufficient basis for the assertion of a fourth amendment
right. Because the "standing" limitation seems only to be used as a
residual device for defeating an otherwise invulnerable claim to con-
stitutional protection, it exemplifies the role of "disentitlement" as a
limit on the scope of the constitutional protection of privacy.
J. A NOTE ON STANDING
The rules governing "standing" to assert a violation of the
fourth amendment and, if successful, to reap the reward of exclu-
sion, magnify the effect of changes in the relative value accorded to
privacy and it's natural competitor, collective security. In the Term
preceding Mapp it was a "standing" caseJones v. United States,390 that
foretold the shift toward privacy. Similarly, Mancusi v. DeForte,391 il-
lustrated the capacity of the Court to use the "expectation of pri-
vacy" formula to enlarge "standing" during the last stage of the
Warren Court. Ten years later, in Rakas v. Illinois392, the four Nixon
appointed justices, joined by Justice Stewart, used the same formula
to drastically shrink the class of persons protected against unreason-
387 Id. at 788, n.24 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
388 Id. at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
389 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
390 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
39' 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
392 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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able searches and seizures. 393
Under Jones a defendant could establish standing (1) by asserting
ownership or possession of the place searched or the thing seized;
(2) by his "lawful presence" on the premises searched; or (3) auto-
matically, as a person charged with the crime of possessing the thing
seized.39 4 None of these grounds has survived application of the
new standing doctrine announced in Rakas v. Illinois 395, United States
v. Salvucci 396 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.3 97
"Standing" in the sense that "the party seeking relief must have
an adversary interest in the outcome" is, as Professor Wayne LaFave
has noted, always satisfied in criminal cases, because the defendant's
"interest in avoiding conviction gives him a very significant personal
stake in the ruling upon his motion to suppress." 398 Further restric-
tion on the class of persons entitled to litigate the constitutionality
of the means by which the government obtained its evidence follows
from the maxim that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights
which ... may not be vicariously asserted."3 99 Logically, however,
this limitation necessarily excludes only the person whose sole con-
nection to the fourth amendment "event" is that it produced the
evidence offered against him or her. Whether any additional con-
nection to that event suffices to establish a "personal" rather than a
"vicarious" right, entails a value judgment that is governed by the
same influences that have shaped the scope of the fourth amend-
ment.400 Not surprisingly, the metamorphosis of "standing" from a
limitation on the remedy of exclusion, in Jones v. United States, to a
limit on the right itself, in Rakas, has dramatically constricted the
boundaries of constitutionally protected privacy.
Rakas accomplished this transformation of the standing limita-
tion in two ways. First, the test for standing was rendered far more
abstract, and thus moremalleable, by discardingJones' "legitimately
on premises" rule as "too broad a gauge" and substituting Katz'
"expectation of privacy" formula. 40 I In place ofJones' "bright line"
excluding only trespassers, Rakas drew a "dim line" that tested the
393 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United State v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980);
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
394 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
395 439 U.S. at 128.
396 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
397 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
398 4 W. LAFAVE, supra note 64, at 299-380.
399 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174
(1969)).
400 Allen, supra note 107, at 23.
401 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
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rights of persons legitimately present according to the duration of
their presence and their proximity to the area searched. 40 2 A visitor
in the kitchen, Justice Rehnquist said, "would have absolutely no
interest or legitimate expectation of privacy in the basement ... a
casual visitor who walks into a house one minute before a search...
commences and leaves one minute after the search ends ... would
have none in the house . ..-4o3 This dictum was reinforced by the
Court's holding that passengers in the back seat of a car stopped
and searched by the police had no "legitimate expectation of privacy
in the glove compartment or area under the seat of the car ... [be-
cause] these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply
would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. '40 4
Of perhaps greater significance than Rakas' reformulation of
the doctrine was the rigor and particularity with which the new
formula was applied. Whereas prior to Rakas, any of the Jones
grounds entitled the defendant to object to the "search and
seizure," 40 5 after Rakas the moving party was required to show that
his "expectation of privacy" had been "violated" by the particular
fourth amendment "event"-entry, search or seizure-that yielded
the materials or information sought to be suppressed.
Rakas, Salvucci and Rawlings involved challenges to the search
for, not the seizure of, the items taken. Each held that the defend-
ant's relationship to the place searched was not sufficient to estab-
lish an expectation of privacy in the place searched: the front seat
and glove compartment of the car in which defendant was a backseat
passenger;40 6 an apartment rented to defendant's mother,40 7 and
the purse of defendant's companion. 408 Obviously, the defendant
had a closer relationship to the things seized: a rifle and ammuni-
tion;409 stolen mail;410 and illegal drugs. 41' Yet in none of the cases
did defendant claim that the seizure of his goods endowed him with
standing to contest the legality of the seizure; each challenged only
the search.
In Rakas, Justice Rehnquist appends a misleading footnote to
402 Id. at 148-49.
403 Id. at 142.
404 Id. at 148-49.
405 See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 117-18 (1980)(Marshall, J., dissenting);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
406 Rakas, 439 U.S. 128.
407 United State v. Salvucci, 448 U.S.83 (1980).
408 Rawlings, 448 U.S. 98.
409 Rakas, 439 U.S. 128.
410 Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83.
411 Rawlings, 448 U.S. 98.
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his discussion of the disentitled "casual visitor": "This is not to say
that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of
evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the
search." 412
In Rawlings, however, the notion that defendant "should be en-
tided to challenge the search.., because he claimed ownership of
the drugs in [his companion's] . . .purse" 413 was dismissed as an
"arcane" property concept irrelevant to "the ability to claim the
protections of the Fourth Amendment." 4 14 This judgment became
the foundation in Salvucci for the Court's overruling, on the same
day, of Jones' grant of automatic standing in possession cases.4 15
"We ... decline to use possession of a seized good as a substitute
for a factual finding that the owner of the goods had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched." 4 16
The legality of a seizure may be challenged either because it
was the product of an unlawful entry or search or because the
seizure itself was improper. The content of the fourth amendment,
however, offers little hope of success for the latter challenge. De-
fendant's bow has only one string: that the government had an in-
sufficient basis for believing that the goods were "associated with
crime. '"417 The nature of the property seized in Rakas, Rawlings, and
Salvucci was so apparently within this standard that the defendants
forwent the option to challenge the seizure.
Thus goods found during a search the defendant is not entitled
to challenge become goods in "plain view." Justice Rehnquist is
correct in saying, in Rawlings, that
[h]ad petitioner placed his drugs in plain view, he would still have
owned them, but he could not claim any legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy. Prior to Rakas, petitioner might have been given standing' in
such a case to challenge a 'search' that netted those drugs but proba-
bly would have lost his claim on the merits. 4 18
Unfortunately, his description of the post-Rakas result gratuitously
confounds the scope of the amendment with its content. "After
Rakas, the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmental offi-
cials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by
petitioner." 419
412 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142, n.1 1 (emphasis added).
413 Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105.
414 Id.
415 Salvucd, 448 U.S. at 185.
416 Id. at 92.
417 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1985).




Similar statements in Rakas420 and Salvucci42' needlessly sow
confusion by blurring the distinction between entitlement to a hear-
ing (the standing or, after Rakas, preliminary scope issue) and suc-
cess at the hearing (the content issue). When the Court viewed
"standing" as a limitation on the remedy of exclusion, it was natural
to find or assume a violation of the fourth amendment before reach-
ing the question of whether a right of the party seeking to suppress
its product had been "violated." After Rakas, however, that formu-
lation yields the nonsense rule that only those defendants whose
rights have been violated are entitled to a hearing to determine
whether their rights were violated.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to ask whether the analytic threads this Article has
traced are all part of a larger fabric. The pattern is complex. As
with an Escher drawing in which fish are transformed into birds,
"searches" and "seizures" become "expectations," and fourth
amendment protection becomes more a matter of judgment than
description. Close examination, as with the drawing, reveals the
strokes by which the transformation of the doctrine was
accomplished.
Katz is the doctrinal linchpin. Thereafter, every intrusion by
government into the private affairs of its citizens became eligible for
inclusion within-or exclusion from, the protective mantle of the
fourth amendment. When the Katz formula is superimposed on the
established search-negating doctrines of "plain view," consent and
"misplaced reliance," or on the seizure-negating notions of "con-
sensual encounter" and "voluntary transfer," the fish and the bird
are identical. There has been no search or seizure because there
can be no expectation of privacy in such circumstances, and vice
versa. The new creature begins to emerge in decisions that deem
certain expectations "unreasonable." The transformation is com-
plete-background becomes foreground-in decisions that deny the
"legitimacy" of expectations against intrusions that are, by any
other measure, searches and seizures. 422
Katz' weakness, however, is also its strength. It bends in both
directions. To accommodate the Court's preference for crime con-
trol, therefore, it is necessary to reinforce Katz with doctrinal and
420 439 U.S. at 140.
421 448 U.S. at 95.
422 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705




analytic devices that make it receptive to the majority's values and
which undermine or deflect Katz' promise to protect any justifiable
expectation of privacy. Chief among these devices is the Court's use
of a rule-dominated approach to determine the meaning of Katz, en-
abling it to defeat any assertion of privacy that is not based upon an
otherwise legally protected right or privilege.423 Moreover, when
that approach is linked to its closest doctrinal kin, the standing rules
announced in Rakas, Salvucci and Rawlings, even the expectations of
occupants, possessors and owners of the place searched or thing
seized may be dismissed as "unreasonable."
The final component in the majority's anti-privacy arsenal is
designed to control the remaining variable in the decisional matrix:
the facts. When the actual facts seem to demand fourth amendment
protection, the Court deflects that result by substituting proxy facts,
hypothetical circumstances that appear similar to the case at hand
but which carry an opposite doctrinal charge. Knotts, for example,
invokes a hypothetical observer to validate the use of an electronic
tracking beacon,424 and Karo carries the technique to (or beyond)
the limits of plausibility425: "any object" is substituted for the bea-
con;42 6 an officer "walking down the street carrying a parabolic
microphone" is substituted for the receipt of the beacon-encum-
bered package;427 and the absence of monitoring is substituted for
extensive monitoring of the device while the package was located in
a number of private residences.428 Similarly, Jacobsen's "re-search"
rule is based on what the private searchers "could have" testified
to; 4 2 9 the aerial surveillance decisions are based on what private pi-
lots or passengers "could" see from public airspace,430 or what a
"power company repair mechanic on a pole overlooking the yard"
could have observed;43' and in Rakas v. United States "standing" by a
423 When the rule-dominated approach would have yielded a privacy-enhancing re-
sult contrary to the majority's predilection, as in the warrantless entry onto private prop-
erty by government agents to observe conditions not accessible from off the premises,
the Court trumped that result by invoking the text of the Constitution: "open fields," it
announced, are not "persons, houses, papers, or effects." See supra notes 249-254 and
accompanying text. Similarly, in Greenwood, the Court denied effect to defendant's state
law right of privacy in his garbage, deeming that argument "no less than a suggestion
that concepts of privacy under the laws of each state are to determine the reach of the
Fourth Amendment." California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988).
424 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
425 Karo, 468 U.S. 705
426 Id. at 713.
427 Id. at 712.
428 Id. at 720.
429 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1984).
430 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986).
431 Id. at 215.
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passenger in his ex-wife's automobile was defeated by reference to a
"'casual visitor" in the kitchen of the searched premises. 432
For one who believes, as this essay suggests, that individual pri-
vacy has been unduly subordinated to law enforcement interests, it
is tempting to blame the doctrine, to find the genesis of the Court's
anti-privacy decisions in the conceptual and analytic apparatus that
monitors the scope of the protection. However, any scheme for de-
riving the reach of the fourth amendment will entail definitional ele-
ments (what is a "search" or "seizure"?), judgmental elements
(what kinds of government observations and acquisitions are within
the prohibition?), and issues at the margin will always arise. For ex-
ample, there is no reason to believe that the result in any case would
be changed by the use of the majority standard in Katz v. United
States-"privacy upon which ... [one has] justifiably relied "43 3 -in
place of Justice Harlan's "reasonable expectation of privacy"
formula.434 Indeed, the Olmstead-Goldman standard, which restricted
the amendment's protection to intrusions that "penetrate" a "con-
stitutionally protected area" could, with effort, embrace all of the
post-Katz results. Each standard necessarily permits judgment and
doctrine is the consequence, not the cause, of its exercise.
The structure of the fourth amendment may suggest an appro-
priate approach to and limits on the exercise of that authority. The
terms with which the scope of the amendment is described -
"searches and seizures"-seem to call for definition, whereas the
term that encapsules the content rules-"unreasonable"-could not
more plainly call forjudgment. Further, although only causal analy-
sis would seem necessary to application of the exclusionary remedy,
its political vulnerability has attracted far more than its share of anti-
privacy sentiment. Thus conduct found within the protection of the
amendment remains subject to two judgmental stages at which the
privacy-crime control balance can be struck. Such "balancing" is
the essence of a standard that forbids "unreasonable" conduct, and
it is inescapable in the application of a controversial remedy that
confers a windfall benefit on a criminal defendant as a byproduct of
its intended deterrent effect. It seems structurally appropriate,
therefore, to minimize the judgmental component in determining
the scope of the amendment. In seeking to define "searches and
seizures," the use of balancing is inappropriate. A fish cannot be
432 Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142.
433 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
434 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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defined as a bird simply because, on balance, there is a need for
more birds.
In several ways, however, reasoning appropriate to molding the
content of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures has been indiscriminately applied to the very different task
of defining what constitutes a search or seizure in the first place. An
almost subliminal manifestation of this tendency is seen when the
Court invokes the content term "reasonable" in announcing a deci-
sion relating to the scope of the amendment. InJacobsen, for exam-
ple, in which the Court ruled that a field test was not a "search" but
that the destruction of a small amount of the suspected powder in
performing the test was a "seizure," the Court "conclude[d] that
both actions were reasonable for essentially the same reason. '435
Similarly, in United States v. Dionisio,436 in which the Court held that a
grand jury summons and order to provide a voice exemplar did not
"infringe ...upon any interest protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment." 43 7 the Court announced that "Dionisio's compulsory appear-
ance before the grand jury was not an unreasonable seizure'. ' 438
In fashioning the predicate for a particular variety of search or
seizure, the Court appropriately seeks to "balance the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment inter-
ests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to
justify the intrusion. '43 9 One such governmental interest is the
need for a "workable standard," a so-called "bright line" to guide
police conduct.440 Neither "balancing" nor the preference for
"bright lines," however, has any proper application to the determi-
nation of whether such conduct amounts to a search or seizure. A
search cannot be deemed a non-search because the government
needs the information sought or because a contrary rule would tax
the officer's ability to understand the scope of the fourth
amendment.
Perhaps the most glaring example of the misuse of "balancing"
analysis occurred in the Court's decision in Schnecklock v. Bus-
tamonte,441 in which the issue was whether knowledge of the right to
withhold consent was essential to its valid exercise. Because "a
search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of ob-
435 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
436 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
437 Id. at 15.
438 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). For other examples see United States v. Dunn, 107 S.
Ct. 1134, 1141 (1987); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715-716 (1984).
439 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
440 See Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MicH L. REv. 1468 (1985).
441 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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taining important and reliable evidence," the Court reasoned, "the
legitimate need for such searches and the equally important require-
ment of assuring the absence of coercion ...must be accommo-
dated in determining the meaning of a voluntary' consent. '442
Weighed on these scales, the Court found ignorant consent, and the
relinquishment of fourth amendment protection it effects,
constitutional.
"Balancing" can also be used, in theory, to expand the scope of
the amendment, as Justice Harlan unsuccessfully urged in his dis-
sent in United States v. White.443 Whether "we should impose on our
citizens the risks of the electronic listener..." must, he argued, "be
answered by assessing ... the likely extent of its impact on the indi-
vidual's sense of security balanced against the utility of the conduct
as a technique of law enforcement. '" 444
When the scope issue is framed not as an attempt to define the
terms "search" or "seizure" but rather as an assessment of
"whether an expectation of privacy is 'legitimate' or 'reasonable'
.." it seems, as the Court said in Hudson v. Palmer, "necessarily [to]
entail.., a balancing of interests. '445 In determining the role of the
fourth amendment in prisons, it seems particularly appropriate to
consider "the interest of society in the security of its penal institu-
tions and the interest of the prisoner in the privacy within his
cell."' 446 The surface appeal of balancing analysis in this context,
however, simply reflects the malleability of the Katz formula in con-
junction with well-founded doubts concerning whether prisoners, as
opposed to society at large, have any claim to privacy within the
prison. If that claim is at all plausible, it cannot be set aside simply
because, on balance, the government needs to search.
The preference for "bright lines" may be appropriate in devis-
ing "reasonable" rules for conducting searches and seizures. Re-
cently, however, the Court has applied similar reasoning to the
dissimilar task of defining what amounts to a search or seizure. In
Oliver v. United States,447 the defendant argued that in some situa-
tions the circumstances might warrant a "reasonable" expectation
of privacy in one's "open fields," based, for example on fencing and
posting of the property, its remote location, the absence of air traf-
fic, and the like. The Court rejected this case-by-case approach be-
442 Id. at 227.
443 401 U.S. 745 (1971)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
444 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
445 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984).
446 Id.
447 466 U.S. 170.
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cause it would not "provide a workable accommodation between the
needs [essentially, the need for a "bright line"] of law enforcement
and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment." 448
Fourth amendment doctrine is driven by society's attitudes and
beliefs about the relative value of autonomy and security. In this
continuing struggle between the individual and the collective there
is only one rule: neither may utterly dominate the other-chaos and
tyranny are equally to be avoided. How any society strikes the bal-
ance will reflect its history, traditions and institutions as well as the
current ratio of fear and hope among its citizens. The fourth
amendment embodies both the commitment of American society to
"the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the po-
lice,"'449 and the larger commitment to a written constitution as the
essential guardian of that freedom. Both commitments imply limits
on the power of the Court: "privacy" may not be defined away; and
analysis must observe the purpose and the structure of the
amendment.
The doctrinal record during the twenty years since Katz reveals
a Court hostile to privacy and, of greater concern, willing to ignore
or subvert the constraints of language and structure in its quest for
the favored result. Although these results undoubtedly reflect dom-
inant public sentiment, there is no shortage of public and private
institutions devoted to absorbing and recycling popular attitudes.
The Court's unique role is to preserve and translate the terms of the
social contract embodied in the Constitution. As monitor of.the
fourth amendment boundary between public authority and private
autonomy, the Court commands extraordinary authority to influ-
ence the nature of American society. The proper exercise of that
power, as Justice Stewart saw must transcend the passions and fash-
ions of the day.
In times of unrest, whether caused by crime or racial conflict or fear of
internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it represents may
appear 'unrealistic or extravagant' to some. But the values were those
of the authors of our fundamental constitutional concepts. In times
not altogether unlike our own, they won by legal and constitutional
means in England, and by revolution on this continent a right of per-
sonal security against arbitrary intrusions by offical power. If times
have changed, reducing every man's scope to do as he pleases in an
urban and industrial world, the changes have made the values served
by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.450
448 Id. at 181. See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 777 (1983)(Court justified its
ruling that the search of table known to contain contraband was outside scope of the
amendment because result yielded a "workable standard.").
449 Wf, 338 U.S. at 27.
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450 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
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